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NORTH HAVEN BD. OF EDUCATION

v.
BELL, Dept. of Eductation
1.

SUMMARY:

Cert b
(Oakes,
Tenney,

Kaufman,~-t-4-~
(DJ) )

Federal/Civil

Timely

This case is straightlined with Bell v.

Dougherty Coupty School System, No. 80-1023.

~
to~ ited
:..,..-----...;

~

A2

Both cases are

States v. Seattle University, No. 80-493, a

case on which cert has already been granted.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

The iss ue in all three of

- 2 of Education to issue regulation s prohibiting sex discrimination

(
in the employment practices of institutions receiving federal
financi~l

assistanc~.

§901 provides in pertinent part that "no

person ..• shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity."

HEW has

interpreted §901 as prohibiting sex discrimination in the
employment practices of educational institutions and has
promulagated regulations to that effect.

34 CFR §106.51 and

§106.54.
The majority of ci

courts, and virtually all of the

District Courts, have held that the regulations are in exce s s of

------

statutory authority.

Seattle University,

~upra

(CA9); Rome o

Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (CA 6), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 972 (1979), Junior Colleg e District of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (CA 8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979);
Islesbo r o School Committee v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (CA 1),
cert. denied, 444

_

employees.
_.

u.s.

972 (1979).

The courts reason that §901

------..,;

The CA 5, in Bell v. Dougherty Cty Sch. Sys, has

taken a middle ground.

Its view is that §901 does not cover

employees generally, but does apply to those employees in
specific programs which receive federal funds.
The CA 2 rejected the reasoning of those courts.

It held

that although the language of §901 is uncle a r, the legislative
history of Title IX evinces Congressional intent that petr

.'---..-.

(

regulate sex discrimination in employment.

It relied

particularly on a comment by Senator Bayh that:
"the portion of the amendment covers
discrimination in all areas where abuse has been
mentioned -- employment practices for facul t y and
administrators, scholarship aid, admissions,
access to programs withiri the institution such as
vocational education classes and so forth. 118
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972).
3.

CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION:

Because of the conflict the

case should be held for Seattle University.

The caveat here is

that respondent in Seattle University has filed a motion to
withdraw, since in its view the case is now moot.

The Department

of Labor has apparently exonerated respondent of any
discrimination in employment pratices.

That motion has been

distributed to the Conference and will be considered at the
Feburary 20 Conference.
In response to Seattle's motion to withdraw, the SG
reiterates its letter dated January 6, 1981 to the Clerk,
contending that the mootness question had been fully aired in the
Court before the grant of cert.
its briefing of the case.

It asserts it will proceed with

It suggests that this Court might want

to appoint counsel as amicus curaie to file a brief in support of
the judgment on review there.

If the Court decides to vacate the

grant, it should grant the petition either in this case or in
Bell v. Dougherty County School System, No 80-1023.

If this

court decides that briefing an argument in Seattle University
should go forward, then both this case and Dougherty should be
held for Seattle University.

- 4 /

I agree that if this Court decides to vacate the grant of
cert in Seattle University, this

case should be granted.

Further, I recommend that Dougherty County be held.
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~- The questio

Question Presented
presented is whether the Sec'y of Educ.

exceeded his authority when he

promul~ated

regulations prohibiting

discrimination on the basis of sex in employment under §901 of Title
IX, 20

u.s.c.

§168l(a), which prohibits sex discrimination in

federally funded educational programs and activities.

2.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Unusual Posture of the Parties
The Sec'y of Educ. now argues that the regulation are

"ultra vires," and he has published notification of new rulemaking.
The Court might feel that there is little point to reaching the
merits.

The SG, unfortunately, disagrees with the Sec'y, and has

continued to litigate despite the Sec'y's . request that he reach some
.
.
.
---....._______
understanding with the private parties and stop. Indeed, the SG now
maintains that.the employment-discrimination regulations are
\

mandated by the statute.

He can, of course, no longer argue that

they are within the scope of the Sec'y's discretion--the Sec'y has
clearly stated that he will exercise his discretion by replacing
them.

See Brief of SG n.26 at 37; Reply Brief (yellow) of North

Haven at 1-2.

~~that
~

v

I may be unaware of how things work, but it seems to me
the Executive should come before this Court with one consistent

position in cases other than those involving independent regulatory

agencies.

And the SG's argument is somewhat irresponsible--by

-:::==:=:::--

arguing that the regulations are mandated by the statute, he may be
restricting future flexibility.

The Executive would, one would

think, necessarily prefer a broad range of options in implementing a
statute.
At first, I could not understand why the SG is wasting the
Court's time.

It is true that, under 20

u.s.c.

§1682, the Sec'y

cannot promulgate the new regulations without the approval of the
President.

But it seems unlikely the SG will really be able to stop

the Sec'y from replacing the regulations with new ones that do not

3.

cover employment. 1

It may be, however, that the SG was unable to

convince the individuals who filed charges to stop litigating, and
one of them, Linda Potz, is a party to the Trumbull Board of
Education suit, see note 14 infra.

Until the regulations are

actually rescinded, Potz has standing to enforce them regardless of
the views of the SG.

See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441

677 {1979) {private right of action under Title IX).

u.s.

And, having

petitioned for cert supporting her, the SG may feel some reluctance ~
to abandon them because of a pending change in administration
policy.

B.

Title IX and the Regulations
Congress passed Title

I~

of the Educational Amendments of

1972 to proscribe discrimination based on sex in educational
institutions with regard to employment, pay, and program
participation.

u.s.c.

Title IX included an amendment to Title VII, 42

§2000e, et seq., removing the previous exemption for

educational institutions with regard to employment discrimination. 2
1 The Dept. of Education is no longer enforcing the regulation.
Under the previous Administration, when the CAs began invalidating
the regulations {in order to avoid wasting resources), the Dept. of
Educ.'s Office foi Civil Rights ·instructed its regional offices to
proceed onlr when" {1) · .•• the prin~ipal purpose of the federal
assistance 1n ~uestion is to provide employment or {2) ••. the
allegedly discriminatory employment practice may have a
discriminatory impact upon students or other direct beneficiaries of
federal assistance:" Petn for Cert at 11 n.4 in Dept. of Educ. v.
Seattle University, 101 S. Ct. 563 {1980).
2The amendment making Title VII applicable to educational
institutions was originally part of Title IX: it passed both houses
and was included in the Conference Report. But it ~as not included
in the final codification enacted as Title IX because it had already
Foo~note continued on next page.

j

4.

Title IX also amended the Equal Pay Act by adding 29

u.s.c.

§213(a)

_?"'

making that Act applicable to professionals and white-collar
workers.

-

And §901 of Title IX, 20

u.s.c.

§1681, the provision

-

l

quoted above, was enacted to bar discrimination in educational

---------------

programs• and

acti~tie ~g fed~al

funds.

~ 01) of Civil
Title IX (§901) was ~ed after ~

Rights Act of 1964, 42

u.s.c.

§2000d, which prohibits discimination

excluding persons from federally financed programs or activities on
the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.
the two statutes is virtually identical. 3

The wording of

In fact, the original

proposal for Title IX was to add "sex" to the list of
discriminations prohibited by Title VI.

But a separate provision

was used so that Title VI would not have to be opened for
' amendments, and a staffer with a xerox copy of Title VI cut and
pasted it into Title IX.

Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings

Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of
Representatives--Review of Regulations to implement Title IX, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. p.409 (1975).

In the past, this Court has noted

that "[t]he drafters of Title IX excplicitly assumed that it would

been passed as part of the 1972 Civil Rights Act, P.L. No. 92-261.
3Title VI (§601) states:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
Title IX (§901) is quoted in text at the beginning of section II.A.l
infra.

5.

be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been

"

~nnon,

441

U.S. at 696 n.l9.
In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) promulgated regulations implementing Title IX.

Subpart E of

these regulations, entitled "Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in
Employment in Education Programs and Activities Prohibited,"
addresses employment, employment criteria, recruitment,
compensation, job classification and structure, fringe benefits,
marital or parental status, advertising for personel, pre-employment
inquires, and sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.
separate appendix to petn for cert at SA to 19A.

See

Although some

parts of the regulation refer to "programs or activities," for the

, ...

"'

most part the regulation regulates the general employment practices
of recipients."

C.

The Response in the Circuits, Including the Decision Below
1.

The other CAs.

Four CAs, CAl, CA6, CAS, & CA9, have

held that Title IX does not authorize regulations covering the
employment practices of recipients. 4

The CAS held that the current

regulations exceeded the scope of HEW's authority, but noted that
HEW would have authority to promulgate regulations applicable to

4 see Seattle Universit~ v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (CA9 19SO), cert
granted, 449 U.S. 1009 (19 0) (being held for this case: probably
moot): Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d SSl (CA6), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979): Junior Colle~e v. Califano, 593 F. 2d
424 (CAB), cert denied, 444 u.s. 972 (197 ): Islesboro School
Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424 , cert denied, 444 u.s. 972
(~ 979) .
'

leA£) \

•

1..;

6.

employees paid with federal funds.s

The CAS agreed with the other

CAs that Title IX does not, for example, give HEW authority to
promulgate general regulations concerning recipients' pregnancy
policies.

Dougherty, 622 F. 2d at 737 n.S.

But the CAS thought

that if, for example, a "female teacher whose salary is defrayed by
federal funds and who is paid less than a male teacher in the same
program," is subject to "discrimination under" a federally funded
program and the recipient's conduct is therefore regulable under
Title IX.

!d., at 738.
2.

The decision below.A Charges of discrimination in

employment were filed with HEW against petrs, the North Haven and
Trumball Boards of Education.

HEW investigated the charges and

began administrative enforcement proceedings to determine whether
funds should be terminated.

The school boards brought separate

suits in the D. Conn., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
against HEW's use of the Subpart E regulations.

In separate actions

before the same judge, summary judgment was granted for the School
Boards.

On appeal to the CA2, the cases were consolidated.
On July 24, 1980, the CA2 (Kaufman, Oakes, & Tenney)

the employment discrimination regulations at

reversed the DC and held that HEW had "authority under Title IX to
--.

promulgate

Separate appendix to petn at 48A-2.
appropriate remedies.

issue here."

The CA2 expressed no view about

Id.

In reaching its decision, the CA2 relied on the language

SDougherty County School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 73S (CAS
1980), cert pending No. 80-1023 (hold for this case).

'

.

7.

and policies of Title IX.
I'\..

And it placed great weight on ambiguous

'-'--

remarks made on the floor of the Senate by Senator Bayh, sponsor of
the amendment to the Education Bill that included Title IX.

The

only written statement of the Senator used by the CA was one
published a month after passage of the legislation.

In addition,

the CA relied on other statements made in debate and on the fact
that Title IX, unlike Title VI, has no provision stating that the
title did not apply to employment and on the fact that Congress had
not amended the statute to limit its scope.

I I.

DISCUSSION

A.

The Statute

1.

Section 901.
"No person ••• shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any eeducational program
or activity~receiving financial assistance, except that
.::=.•r §901, 20 u.s.c. §168l(a).

A natural reading of these words limit the statute's scope to
i/L

\'

discrimination against beneficiaries.

It strains the language to

maintain that teachers, administrators, secretaries, etc., who are
discriminated against in employment are thereby excluded from
participating in a program (students, not teachers, and certainly
not administrators or secretaries, participate in programs) or
denied its benefits (it is not designed to benefit those running it
but those participating in it) or subjected to discrimination under
the program (they may be discriminated against by the recipient's
policies, but it is not discrimination under the program--an
administrator may even be running the program) •

;/~.£~

~~

8.

The natural reading of the statute is reinforced by the

-

list of nine excemption's from Title IX, all of which deal with
~

-

participants in vprogra~sJnot recip~'s employees. 6 And because
'
~......____~
this list is so thorough and carefully drawn, one suspects that if
Congress had meant to include employment discrimination under Title
IX, it would have included some definitions or exemptions-such as
the exemption for bona fide seniority systems under Title VII.
This is not to say that the language of the statute would
never extend to any employment decisions.
employment when the program or activity

The statute does cover

e~~loys

participants, e.g.,

a work-study program would be an educational program and therefore
under Title IX even though the program is one of employment.
2.

Section 902.

Section 901 proscibes discrimination in

an "educational program or activity."

It is enforced by §902 which

authorizes each federal department and agency extending financial
assistance to educational programs to issue
"rules, regulations, or ordeis of general aplicability
which shall be· consistertt with achievement of the
objectives of the statute ~uthorizing the financial
assistance in connection with which the action is taken •
• • • • Compliance with any require·ment adopted pursuant to
'

.

6section 901 is followed by these nine exceptions:
(1)
statute's coverage limited- with regar
issio
0 educational
institutions; (2) gives dates for applicability of statute to
admissions; (3) statute not applicable to religious institution if
its application would be inconsistent with religious tenets; (4)
exception for institutions training solders or merchant-marine
personel; (5) exception for admissions to college or university that
has always and only admitted one sex; (6) exception for certain
sororities, fraternities, the girl and boy scouts, etc.; (7)
exception fo certain national conferences for young people open only
to one sex; (8) exception for mother-daughter father-son activities;
and (9) scholarships awarded by institutions of higher education in
"beauty" pagents.

,.:.:'::

9.

this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or
refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has
been an express finding •.• of a failure to comply with
such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be
limited ••• in its effect to the particular program, or
part thereof, in which such noncom liance has been so
oun , or
any o er means aut or1ze
y aw •••• '
(emphasis added).
Thus, the enforcement mechanism, like §901 itself, applies to
"educational programs and activities" rather than institutions.
Section 902 provides for the termination of funding once a
violation has been found, but funding is only cut-off on a "program"
basis.

The employment regulations operate on a recipient bases,

regulating, for example, a recipient's general pregnancy policy.
The regulations are therefore inconsistent with §902's requirement
that funding terminations be progrma-specific.

Indeed, the SG has

now conceded this point, and is forced to urge a narrowing
construction to preserve the regulations.

See SG's Brief at 43-46.

He also argues that although "the regulations are not models of
clarity on this point, they do not necessarily mandate such broad
coverage."

!d., at 46.

This later argument requires, however, that

one ignore the clear language of the regulations stating that
recipients "shall" and "shall not" have certain employment practices
and policies as a general matter without the slightest suggestion
that the regulations apply only to employment decisions and policies
made to staff federally funded programs and activities.

B.

Legislative Histroy
1.

Modelled after Title VI.

As discussed in section I.B

supra, Title IX is modelled after (actually, cut and pasted from)

10.
Title VI, which bans discimination on the basis of race in federally
funded programs and activities.

From the beginning, it was

understood that Title VI did not apply to discrimination in the
employment of those operating the federally assisted programs and
activities.

See 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 ( 196 4}

General Kennedy} 7 ;

Civil Rights:

(statement of Attorney

Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the

House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964}

(statement

of Congressman Celler, chairman of the House Rules Committee and
House Floor Manager for Title VI}. 8

Section 604 was nevertheless

added to Title VI to ensure that it would not construed as covering
all employment in federally funded programs. 9
not, however, seen as a change in the law. 10

This amendment was

7The Attorney General explained:
"Title VI is limited in application to instances of
discrimination against beneficiaries of Federal assistance
programs, as the language of §601 clearly indicates." 110
Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964}.
8 The Congressman agreed that Title VI
"applies only to the policy of the management of the
school as far as students are concerned" and that
discrimination against an applicant for employment in
connection with a federally assisted program "has nothing
to do with title 6. That . would come under FEPC [Fair
Employment Practices Commission]."
9 section 604, 42 u.s.c. §2000d-3:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to authorize action under this subchapter by any
department or agency with respect to any emplyment practce
or any employer, employment agency, or labor organiztion
except where a primary objective of the Federal financial
assistance is to provide employment."
Footnote(s} 10 will appear on following pages.

11.
The SG attempts to negate the inference drawn from Title VI
by noting that Title IX does not have any provision analogous to
§604 of Title VI.

See Brief of SG at 36 n.25.

The initial version

of Title IX did include a §904 equivalent to §604 of Title VI, but
this was deleted because parts of Title IX--namely, the amendments
to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act--were to apply to emplyment.

And

§904 was then quietly removed from the bill to remedy the "drafting
error"--not to make a substantive change. 11
Even the CA2 has construed Title VI as not covering
employment except with respect to "federal funds aimed primarily at
providing employment."

Association Against Discrimination in
.

.

\

\~

Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 25 FEP Cases 1013, 1028 (CA2
1981}.

And, as mentioned above in secion I.B supra, this Court has

10 In the words of Senator Humphrey, the Senate Floor leader of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
"[W]e have expressed in specific legislative language what
has always been intended." 110 Cong. Rec. 12707 (1964}.
11 see Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of
Representatives--Review of Regulations to implement Title IX, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. p.409 (1975} (comments of Congressman O'Hara}:
"The staff was given overnight to draft this whole thing
[Title IX] and they goofed, 904 got in there by mistake.
"Now, great significance is being given to the fact
that it was dropped out. It was dropped out because it
got in through a drafting error. So the quiet, easy way
to get it out was to slide it out somewhere along the line
without having to go through a long explanation of how it
got in."

n

12.
noted that "[t]he drafters of Title IX excplicitly assumed that it
would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been
441 U.S. at 696 n.l9.

II

Cannon,

-

Title VI is, therefore, strong evidence that

Title IX was not intended to regulate employment practices of
recipients of federal funds.

2.

Senator Bayh and colleagues.

The parties and the CA2

below present an exhaustive analysis of every relevant word ever
spoken in either House.

See Brief of Petrs (blue) at 63-79; Brief

of SG at 23-28; decision below in separate appendix to petn for cert
at 33A-41A & 44A-45A.

On balance, the debates suggest that Congress

as a whole perceived Title IX as not including employment
discrimination.

Senator Bayh, sponsor of the amendment that became

Title IX, and a few other supporters, such as Senator McGovern, see
Brief of SG at 22-23, may have had a different understanding.

All

statements providing support for the regulations were made in debate
(or in an explanation prepared after the passage of the Act, see
separate appendix to petn at 41A) .
Although a few statements of a handful of legislators
support the regulations, deference to those statements--rather than
the Congress' understanding that this act was modelled after Title
VI which did not encompass employment discrimination--is
inappropriate.

Legislative history has been used by the Court for a

relatively short period--only since the late Thirties or the
Forties.

Initially, there was no danger of legislative history

created under false pretenses, i.e., because courts had not, in the
past, referred back to legislative history, the sources initially

13.

consulted were the compilation of the legislative process in its
natural condition.
As courts have turned increasingly to legislative history,
it is increasinly difficult to be sure of the integrity of these
sources.

Reports continue to be the best indication of what the

drafters and those who passed the legislative are likely to have
thought.

No doubt parts of reports are now written with an eye to

the courts, but reports are available to all prior to the vote and
reliance on the reports as indicating the understanding of Congress
is not entirely misplaced.

Reports will usually describe accurately

the compromise between competing interest groups achieved in the
legislation--and the interest groups certainly have adequate
incentive to ensure that the reports do truthfully report the deal
struck.
Remarks "on the floor"

are another matter.

There is no

guaranty that any member of Congress heard statements appearing in
the pages of Cong. Rec.~

one cannot tell by looking at Cong. Rec.

whether statements were actually made on the floor or whether they

.

-

were added to the record in written form after Congress adjouned fo
the day.

Even what looks like a colloquy between two members may

have been added in written form without ever being spoken.

And if

the statements were actually made on the floor, it is likely that
only a handful of members were present and that even fewer were
paying attention.

Courts engage in acts of pure fiction when they

rely on such statements as indicative of anything other than one
person's views--views he might be expressing only to influence
courts on a point on which he lost in the legislative compromise and

' ..

/~

14.
could not, therefore, see included in a report.
Courts do accord greater weight to reports than "debates,"
but it would save everone a lot of time and result in more accurate
decisions if the Court were to hold that, as a general matter, 12
debates should not be considered because they are unreliable:
considering them, as I think the case at bar indicates, is likely to
frustrate, not fulfill, the understanding and intent of the Congress
that enacted the legislation in question.
As Justice Jackson noted in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Corp., 341 U.S. 384,, 395-96 (1951)

(Jackson, J., joined by Minton,

J., concurring):
"Resort to legislative history is only justified where
the face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I
~~~~~AA .
think we should not qo beyond the Committee reports, whichd~~- 
presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. I
cannot deny that I have sometimes offended against that n~
rule. But to select casual statements from floor debates, 1 A
.
1~
not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, as a
~~
basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended
to enact is to substitute ourselves for the Congress in
one of its important functions •••• For us to undertake to
reconstruct an enactment from legislative history is
merely to involve the Court in political controversies
which are quite proper in the enactment of a bill but
should have no place in is interpretation.
The decision below illustrates the broad latitude courts have in
deciding what a statute means if remarks "on the floor" can be used

12 There might be unusual circumstances in which courts can tell
that a debate is actually reliable, but a per se rule might be best
for two reasons. First, as soon as one opens this door at all, it
is hard to keep courts from looking to see what is within--and once
that happens, courts seem unable to restrain themselves from relying
on legislative history regardless of reliability. Second, the legal
community will save the time and money of searching through the
Congressional Record only if the rule is per se.

15.
as their rationale.

3.

Failure to amend.

The regulations were subject to a

two-house veto: they were effective 45 days after promulgation
unless overruled by a concurrent resolution.

In the Senate, Senator

Helms introduced a resolution disapproving the regulations in their
entirety.

See 121 Cong. Rec. 17300 (1975).

No action was taken.

In the House, the Subcommittee on Post-secondary Education
held six days of hearings and various members of the Subcommittee
introduced resolutions disapproving various portions of the
regulations, including the education portion.
(1975).

121 Cong. Rec. 21687

No action was taken.
The SG argues that this history supports the proposition

that the regulations are consistent with the intent of the enacting
Congress.

It is not all that easy to get bills through Congress,

however. And the Court should be reluctant to read inaction when
one- or two-house vetos are possible as endorsement of agency
action.

If anything, even this much negative committee response

suggests that the regulations might not have been precisely what the
earlier Congress had in mind.

C.

Policy Considerations
1.

Overlapping jurisdiction.

If the regulations are

valid, then the Dept. of Educ. (and any other agency authorized to
spend money for educational programs and activities) and EEOC both
~

have jurisdiction over the employment practices of educational
organizations receiving federal funds.

It would be one thing if

16.

overlapping jurisdicton only meant an additional remedy in the event
of the same unlawful act.

The regulations define employment

practices that may result in the termination of funds, however, and
there is no guarantee that these regulations will be consistent with
EEOC's.
Moreover, in maintaining that the regulations are mandated
by the statute (not subject to agency discretion, see discussion in
section I.A supra), the SG argues that the Sec'y of Educ. has but
little expertise in this area:

"The Department of Education has

only limited expertise in employment matters."

Brief of SG n.26 at

~

37.

It would be interesting

~

ask the SG why he thinks Congress

delegated j~o~over e~ployment, duplicating the jurisdiction~
of the EEOC, to an inept administrator.

If the Sec'y of Educ. is

has little expertise with regard to employment (the regulations have
been on the books since 1975), then the Sec'y of Educ. may not have
been qualified to ivestigate the employment practices of the North
Haven 13 and Trumbull School Boards. 14
13 The North Haven Board refused to rehire a tenured teacher who
had taken a one-year maternity leave. In the subsequent
investigation, HEW asked North Haven to provide specific information
concerning its policies on hiring, leaves of absence, seniority, and
tenure.
At this point, North Haven sought an injunction in DC.
14 A former guidance counselor in the Trumbull public schools,
Linda Potz, filed a charge that the Trumbull Board gave her inferior
job assignments, inferior working conditions, and refused to renew
her contract because of her sex. HEW determined that Trumbull had
indeed violated Title IX by requiring Potz to type and run errands
not required of male counselors, by moving her office to a smaller,
poorly heated, and less comfortable space in the gym away from the
other counselors, by asking her to change a report showing that she
had seen many more students in a given week that the number seen by
her male counterparts, and by not renewing her contract, all on the
basis of sex.

17.

2.

Should participants be denied programs when there is

employment discrimination?

Another reason to hesitate before

reading Title IX as covering employment discrimination is the effect
such an extension would have.

It is one thing to say, as Congress

clearly did, that if a federally funded educational program
discriminates among participants on the basis of sex, the federal
government will not continue to fund it--in other words, if the
recipient denies the benefit to an otherwise qualified applicant on
the basis of sex, then all beneficiaries will receive that
treatment.

It is another to presume that Congress also meant to

authorize the termination of funds benefiting program participants
because the recipient disciminated against an employee.

III.

CONCLUSION

The question presented is whether Title IX, which bans
discrimination in federally funded educational activities and
programs, covers discrimination in employment by recipients.

The

current regulations apply generally to a recipient's employment
practices and are not limited by program (as required for fund
terminations under §902) or to discimination against participants in
educational programs, such as work study, involving employment.

Nor

are the regulations limited to so-called "infectious"
discrimination--discrimination in employment affecting the
atmosphere of the program for participants.
The statute's language and legislative history indicate
that the regulations are not authorized by §901.

The contrary

evidence consists of statements in Cong. Rec. (which might or might

18.

not have been made on the floor), an explanation published after the
statute's enactment, and congressional inaction in a two-house veto
situation.
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North Haven Board of Education v. Bell
/

MEMORANDUM TO FILE:

This is a brief memo dictated merely to

refresh my memory as to the issues in these two consolidated
cases, presenting the same question.

I will want to take a

.'

closer look at the briefs, certainly before going to
Conference.
Petitioners are two Connecticut school districts that
receive federal financial assistance, and therefore are
subject to the provisions of Title IX.

The pertinent

provisions of Title IX are:
Section 901 provides that "no person ••.
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denTed the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance."
Section 902 provides, in substance, that each
federal department or agency empowered to
grant federal assistance is authorized to
promulgate regulations to effectuate Section
901.

.

'

2.

To implement Section 901, HEW issued regulations

·.

,~

It

prohibiting sex discrimination in the employment practices
of federally assisted education programs (1977) .
After complaints were filed of discrimination in
employment - by a tenured teacher who had taken a one year
maternity leave and a former employee who had been given
"inferior job assignments" and who was fired.

HEW notified petitioners that it had received
complaints, and requested "information concerning their
•

policies on hiring, leaves of absence, seniority, and
tenue."

The school districts instituted these consolidated

suits, seeking a declaratory judgment that Title IX confers
no authority on HEW to regulate employment practices.

The

DC agreed with respondents and invalidated the employment
practice regulations.

CA 2, however, reversed.

Petitioner's Argument
Their brief asserts there have been 17 decisions
declaring subpart E of the Reg (herein referred to as the
Reg) illegal,

with only CA 2 holding otherwise.

If the

'' H:u!.

~

cases are correctly cited (Pl3) , at least a half a dozen of
these decisions are CA's.
The case is one of statutory construction, and typically - the parties each

.

'

~~?port

to rely on the

~·~

m

~

plain~ ~-

3.

langauge, legislative history, and the structure of the
various regulatory statutes.
Other pertinent statutes, in addition to Title IX, are
Title VII (the basic anti-discrimination law), Title VI, The
Equal Pay Act (equal pay for women), and Title XIX.
Petitioners' principal arguments are that Sections 901

and 902 are directed at beneficiaries

(~~~~~ ~

colleges) of federally financed education programs, and not
at their employees:

~

..

I

that 902 speaks in terms of

"particular programs or parts thereof that receive federal
aid", and that therefore the

regulation~ with

respect to all

employees of a school or college are not authorized.
The key language of Section 901 parallels directly, as
the Court noted in Cannon, Section 601 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The legislative history of Title

VI makes clear that Section 601 thereof was not intended to
cover employment discrimination.
Respondents also argue that the federal government and
individual employees have

~ her

mean~

to remedy employment

discrimination by educational institutions, notably Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act, functioning particularly through
EEOC and the Secretary of Labor.

''

4.

The Solicitor Generals's Brief
Apart from construing the language of Section 901 and
902 differently from petitoners, the SG relies heavily on
his reading of the legislative history.
He notes the similarity between Sections 901 and 902 of
Title IX to Title VI, but emphasizes that Title VI includes
a provision (Section 604 thereof) that expressly excludes
from its coverage "employment practices", subject to certain
exceptions.

The SG points out that similar language was

proposed and rejected with respect to Tile IX, quoting
statements made on the Floor by Senator Byah.
The parties differ as to the signifinance of the
rejection of a provision similar to Section 604.
petitioner's brief.

See

Petitioners counter with the argument

J.

that the Justice Department propose language for Title IX
A

that would have expressly included employment discrimination
in the coverage of Section 901, a proposal that was
rejected.

***
Some very tentative thoughts:

It seems to me that the

language itself rather strongly favors the petitioners.

At

best, it is ambiguous, and in view of other specific
legislation authorizing employment regulation one normally
would not construe ambiguous langauge as adding a further
layer of federal oversight.

5.

With EEOC and the Labor Department both having
extensive authority over discrimination in employment, there
appears to be no need to add a third regulatory agency.

I

would be reluctant to construe Sections 901 and 902 to this
effect unless my clerk can persuade me rather clearly that
this was congressional intent.
Finally, the decison of CA 2 stands alone against an
impressive array of other federal court decisions.

I would

like to read one of the best of these decisions.
',

,.~ '

..

.

.
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to the provisions of Title IX.
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provisions of Title !X are:
Section 901 provides that "no person •••
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of,
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Section 902 provides, in substance, that each
federal department or agency empowered to
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To implement Section 901, HEW issued regulations
prohibiting seX' discrimination i.n the employment practices
of federally assisted education programs (1977) •
After complaints were filed of discrimination in
employment
- by a tenured teacher who had taken a one year
. .
maternity leave and a former employee who had been given
"inferior job assignments" and who was fired.

HEW notified petitioners that it had received
, complaints, and requested "information concerning their
policies on hiring, leaves of absence, seniority, and
tenue."

The school districts instituted these consolidated

suits, seekinq a declaratory iudgment that Title IX confers
no authority on HEW to regulate employment practices.

'r'he

DC agreed with respondents and i.nvalidated the employment
practice regulations.

CA 2, however, reversed.

Petitioner's Argument
Their brief asserts there have been 17 decisions
declaring subpart E of the Reg (herein referred to as the
Reg) illegal,

with only CA 2 holding otherwise.

If the

cases are correctly cited (Pl3), at least a half a dozen of
these decisions are CA's.
The case is one of statutory constructi.on, and typically - the parties each proport to rely on the plain

. '·
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langauge, legislative history, and the structure of the
various regulatory statutes.
Other pertinent statutes, in addition to Title tX, are
Title VII (the basic anti-discrimination law), Title VI, The
Equal Pay Act (equal pay for women), and Title XIX.
Petitioners' pri.ncipal arguments are that Sections 901
and 902 are directed at beneficiaries (e.g. the schools or
colleges) of federally financed education programs, and not
at their employees1 and that 902 Rpeaks in terms of
"particular programs or parts thereof that receive federal
aid", and that therefore the regulation with respect to all
employees of a school or college are not authorized.
The key language of Section qol parallels directly, as
the Court noted in Cannon, Section 601 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The legislative history of Title

VI makes clear. that Section 601 thereof was not intended to
cover employment discrimination.
Respondents also argue that the federal government and
individual employees have other means to remedy employment
discrimination by educational institutions, notably Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act, functioning particularly through
EEOC and the Secretary of Labor.

4.

The Solicitor Genet:als's 'Brief
Apart from construing the language of Section 901 and
902 differently from oetitoners, the SG re1.ies heavjly on

his reading of the legislative history.
He notes the similarity between Sections 901 and 902 of
Title IX to 't'itle VI, but emphasizec; that Title VI includes
a provision (Section 604 thereof) that expressly excludes
from its coverage "employment practices", subject to certain
except ions.

't'he SG poi.nts out that s :f.ml lar J anguage was

proposed and rejected with respect to Tile IX, quoting
statements

ma~e

on the Floor by Senator. Byah.

The parties differ as to the signifinance of the
rejection of a provision similar to Section 604.
petitioner's brief.
that the

Justic~

See

Petitioners counter with the argument

Department prooose language for Title IX

that would have expressly included employment dlscrimi.nation
in the coverage of Section 901, a proposal that was
rejected.

***
Some very tentative thoughts:

It seems to me that the

language itself rather strongly favors the petitioners.

At

best, it is ambiguous, and in view of other specific
legislati.on authorizing employment regulation one normally
would not construe ambiguous langauqe as adding a further
layer of federal oversight.

,.
~If\~,~~~~·

..

'•

·.
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5.

Wlth EEOC and the Labor Department both having
extensive authority over discrimination in employment, there
appears to be no need to add a third regulatory agency.

I

would he reluctant to construe Sections 901 and 902 to this
effect unless my clerk can persuade me rather clearly that
this was congressional intent.
Finally, the decison of CA 2 stands alone against an
impressive array of other federal court decisions.

I would

like to read one of the best of these decisions.
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Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (CA9 1980), cert granted,
449 U.S. 1009 (1980)

(being held for this case; probably moot)

(CA9's description of rationale of other CA's, which it adopts).
The first of these CAs to reach the issue was the CAl in
Islesboro School v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424
&

Bownes), cert denied, 444

opinion).

u.s.

972 (1979)

(CAl)

(Coffin, Campbell,

(book attached)

(good

The court began with the langue of the statute:

"on its face, [the statute] is aimed at the beneficiaries
of the federal monies, i.e., either students attending
institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged
in special research being funded by the government. The
s~i~_ Q9t_~lud_e_~pjyee§ . within j._t~ terms. This
reading of the ~lain~~~Ege is buttressed by an
examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the
statute. They all deal with student admissions or
activities of a student nature, ..•. Nothing in the
statute suggests that it should be construed to exten~to
employees ~ employees (as opposed to their status as
recipients of specialized federal f~nding for a special
activity or research)." Id., at 426.
The next CA to consider the issue was the CA8 in Junior
College v. Califano, 597 F. 2d 119 (CA8), cert denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).

The First Circuit's decision in Islesboro is quite good,

and the CA8 simply adopted it.

After doing so, it remarked that

"[t]he First Circuit accurately noted that the plain language
does not include employment discrimination."

---------------------------

Id., at 121.

The third CA was the CA6, in Romeo Community Schools v.
HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).

With

regard to HEW's construction of Title IX, the court stated:
"We find HEW's construction of Title IX to be
strained.
It seeks a reading of ... 'no person shall be
discriminated against, on the basis of sex, in the
operation of any educational institution receiving federal
financial assistance.' However, as actually written, the
statute is not nearly so broad. The words 'no person' are

;

'
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I.
1.

THE STATUTES

Title VI (Section 601).
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
42 u.s.c. §2000d.

2.

Title VII (Section §703 (a)).
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(!)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, religion, sex, or
national origin."

3.

Title IX (section 901).
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any educational program or
activity receiving financial assistance, except that .••• " §901,
20 u.s.c. §168l(a).

4.

The Equal Pay Act (29

u.s.c.

§206(d).

"Prohibition of sex discrimination.
(1) No employer having employees subject to any
provisiQnS-of~his section shall discriminate, within any
establishment in which such emp oyees are employed, between
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees
in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which
he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such
establishment for the equal work on jobs the performance of
which requres equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions, except
where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system;
(iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex:
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate
differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in
order to comply with the provisions of this subsection,
reduce the wage rate of any employee."

3.

5.

As drafted and as it initially passed both houses, Title IX

would have amended both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.

Title VII

banned discrimination on the basis of sex from the very beginning,
but §70l(b) defined employer as not including a state or political
subdivision with respect to its employees in educational
institutions.

There was also an exemption from

T~tle

VII coverage

for all persons employed in all educational institutions.
The Equal Pay Act also banned discrimination on the basis
of sex, but it did not apply to executive, administrative, or
professional employment.
As originally drafted, Title IX of the Higher Education
Act of 1971 included sections amending both Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act, making both applicable to professionals employed at
educational institutions.

The amendments to Title VII were also

included in the Civil Rights Act of 1972, which was enacted first.
The amendments to Title VII were in the Higher-Education-Act bills
all the way through Conference, and were dropped from the final
codification only because the Civil Rights 'Act of 1972 was already
law.

II.

HAVE COURTS CONSIDERED THE STATUTORY UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR
THE REGULATIONS?
v

1.

•

~

~

Four CAs (CAl, CA6, CA8, & CA9) think that the statutory

language does not support the regulations.
the Sec'y's regulations because

~

Four CAs have rejected

"neither the

Title IX nor the legislative history support HEW's
~0

Congress intended that statute reach employment discrimination."
1\

4

0

Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (CA9 19SO), cert granted,
449

u.s.

1009 (19SO)

(being held for this case; probably moot)

(CA9's description of rationale of other CA's, which it adopts).
The first of these CAs to reach the issue was the CAl in
Islesboro School v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424 (CAl)
&

Bownes), cert denied, 444

opinion).

u.s.

972 (1979)

(Coffin, Campbell,

(book attached)

(good

The court began with the langue of the statute:

"on its face, [the statute] is aimed at the beneficiaries
of the federal monies, i.e., either students attending
institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged
in special research being funded by the government. The
sect'on does not include ern yees within its terms. This
reading of the pla1n language 1s uttressed y an
examination of the specifi c exemptions mentioned in the
statute. They all deal with student admissions or
activities of a student nature, ••.• Nothing in the
statute suggests that it should be construed to exten ~ to
employees ~ employees (as opposed to their status as
recipients of specialized federal funding for a special
activity or research)." Id., at 426.
The next CA to consider the issue was the CAS in Junior
College v. Califano, 597 F. 2d 119 (CAS), cert denied, 444
(1979).

u.s.

972

The First Circuit's decision in Islesboro is quite good,

and the CAS simply adopted it.

After doing so, it remarked that

"[t]he First Circuit accurately noted that the plain language
does not include employment discrimination."

Id., at 121.

-----------------------------------~The third CA was the CA6, in Romeo Community Schools v.
HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).

With

regard to HEW's construction of Title IX, the court stated:
"We find HEW's construction of Title IX to be
strained. It seeks a reading of •.• 'no person shall be
discriminated against, on the basis of sex, in the
operation of any educational institution receiving federal
financial assistance.' However, as actually written, the
statute is not nearly so broad. The words 'no person' are

5.

modified by later language which clearly limits their
meaning, The concern of this particular statute is not
with all discrimination against persons in any way
connected with educational institutions which receive
federal funding. Rather, it reaches only those types of
disparate treatment which manifest themselves in exclusion
from, denial of benefits of, or otherwise result in
discrimination on the basis of sex 'under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistnce
' Unless the discrimination relates to a program or
activity which receives federal funding, it is not
prohibited by §1681."
The fourth CA, the CA9, in University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992
(CA9 1980), cert granted, 449
case; probably moot)

u.s.

1009 (1980)

(being held for this

simply reported and adoped the rationales of

the other CAs after noting that the others had concluded that
"neither the

plain language of Title IX nor the legislative history

support HEW's contention that Congress intended that statute reach
employment discrimination."
2.

(As quoted in opening paragraph).

CAS expressed no view on question.

The only other CA

7

to have considered the case is the CAS, in Dougherty County School
System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 73S (CAS 1980), cert pending No. 80-1023
(hold for this case).

The CAS held that the current regulations

exceed the Sec'y's authority, but noted that the Sec'y would have
authority to promulgate regulations applicable to employees employed
in particular programs receiving federal funds.

The CA did not

directly address the clarity of the statutory language, though it
did base its construction on the fact that a teacher discriminated
in employment could be regarded as "subjected to discrimination
under" a program receiving federal financial assistance.

Id., at

738.
The CAS did stress that it was "according great lattitute
to the Secretary."

Id., at 737.

And the CAS also stressed that the

6.

courts should accord deference to the Sec'y's interpretation.

This

emphasis suggests that the CAS did not read the statute as
unambiguous support for the regulations.

If the clear language of

the statute supported the regulations, reliance on broad agency
discretion and notions of deference would not have been necessary.
The SG, at oral argument, said that he agreed with the CAS
decision and thought it was a good opinion.

Not only did the CAS

overrule the current regulations because they are not programspecific, the CAS by no means indicated that even the more limited
regulations it would consider valid (applying to employment of
teachers in federally funded programs) would be valid because
mandated by the statute.

Indeed, a reading of the CAS's decision

suggests that those regulations would most likely be sustained by
the CAS only as a valid exercise of authority on the part of the
Sec'y.

The SG has conceded in n.26 at 37 that, were the Sec'y to

exercise any discretion, he would rescind the regulations.

This

Court cannot, therefore, sustain the regulations on the basis the
CAS would presumably use in upholding the more limited regulations
it indicated it would consider valid.

III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
1.

very unfair.

Title VI.

Was SG fair?

I think the SG's treatment of this point was

He made two main points.

(i) The inclusion of §604

(Title VI does not apply to employment) creates a strong presumption
that Title IX must since it does not include a similar §904.

(ii)

The House version contained a §904 and it "receded" at Conference

7.

indicates that the House lost on the substantive question of whether
Title IX applied to employment.
The SG agrees that §604 was meant to state the obvious.
Its absence from Title IX should not, therefore, matter.

I think he

is wrong in stating that the inclusion of a clarification in one
section means that that section is substantively different from
another equivalent section lacking the clarifying language.

His

rigid rule does not recognize the sloppy way in which legislation is
drafted--as the cut-and-paste job in the case at bar illustrates.
As I mentioned when we talked, the fact that the House
"receded" hardly means the House recognized that it had lost on a
substantive point.

It simply means that the House agreed not to

fight to retain §904.

That concession should not mean much given

that §604 was never regarded as necessary and §904, as then drafted,
clearly had to come out of the bill since it was inconsistent with
the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act which were within
Title IX at the time of the Conference, see discussion in section
I.~

supra.

Given that the provision was apparently regarded as

unnecessary {§604 was seen as unnecessary) , the easiest solution
would have been to simply drop it rather than re-draft it so as to
apply to only parts of Title IX.

All this is clear from looking at

the bill before the Conference and the history of §604, even without
relying on the corroborative testimony given by Congressman O'Hara
at the later hearing.
2.

The debates.

The SG was no fairer here.
~

noting that two parts of Title IX being discussed:
~

He began by

{i) the

amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act {EPA) and {ii) Title

8.
IX

~lf

(§901).

He then stated that any portion of the legislative

history--i.e., any specific reference to employment--might apply to
(i) only or (ii) only or both.
propositions:
only applied to

He then presented his two

(a) no where was there any suggestion that Title IX
emp~ment

through the amendments to the EPA and

Title VII; and (b) there are three Bayh statements that are only
consistent with coverage of employment by Title IX.
(a).
VII amendments.

No evidence em 1

ent onl

covered b

This is certainly not true.

~~~

~A

and Title

Senator Bayh himself

stated:
"I might point out that, so far as involvement or
supervision by the Secretary of HEW is concerned, we
really are not doing anything to the private school that
is not now in the law under title VI of the 1964 civil
rights Act, relating to discrimination in other areas.
"We are saying that the power which now resides in the
Federal Government over private institutions shall be
extended. We are only adding the 3-letter word 'sex' to
existing law." 117 Cong. Rec. 30408 (1971) (Senator
Bayh).
In addition, there are many descriptions of the legislation
which tacitly assume that employment is covered by the EPA and Title
VII amendments rather than §901.

It is true that these descriptions

do not come out and state "and employment is covered only under
§901, but such a broad statement would not really be true.

All

concede that §901 would cover employment when §601 would cover
employment--e.g., in a work-study program or a program of grants for
research.

In the general descriptions of the legislation, even that

given by Senator Bayh in the prepared portion of his remarks, the
implicit understanding is that direct coverage of employment is
under Title VII and EPA not Title IX:

9.

"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally
assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately
the proh~tion does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my
amendment sets forth prohibition and enfocement provisions
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI. 118
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (emphasis added) (Bayh).
Thus, in presenting the summary of §901 of Title IX, Bayh indicated
that his amendment was equivalent to Title VI and would end
discrimination against "the beneficiaries of federally assisted
programs and activities."

Senator Bayh then, in a separate part of

this statement, discussed the changes in Title VII and the EPA under
the heading "B.
Praqctices."

Prohibition of Education-Related Employment

Id., at 5808.

The relevant section of the House

Report contains a similar breakdown.
1st Sess. 51-51 (1971).

H. R. Rep. No. 554, 92d Cong.,

As the CAl noted in discussing Bayh's

summary, of the bill:
"This breakdown demonstrates that the basic provisions
dealing with admissions and services at educational
institutions, now embodied in Title IX, were weparate and
distict from the provisions amendding Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act, both of which dealt with employment." Id.,
at 428.
(2) Three statements demand that Title IX cover
employment?

There are three portions of Bayh's remarks which, if

the words are parsed like a statute, indicate that §901 applies to
employment.

One of them--the prepared one!--is clearly confused.

It uses the wrong section numbers in referring to the act and in one
sentence indicates that §901 will apply to employment and in the
next states that the provision has "been tested under title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act for the last 8 years so that we have
evidence of [its] effectiveness and flexibility."

118 Cong. Rec.

10.
5807 (1972) •

Bayh did not have a good grasp of the details of the

statute.
Looking at the debates as a whole, I agree with the CAl.
The remarks on which the SG would place

~e

such reliance

"were the product of the imprecision of oral discussion
rather than a reflection that the Act intended section 901
of Title IX to embrace prohibitions against sex
discrimination in employment. This was reserved for the
amended Title VII and Equal Pay Act." 593 F. 2d at 428.
Given that Bayh himself told the Congress his amendment would only
extend the coverage of Title VI and did so in clear and unambiguous
words, the fact that other portions of his statements in the rather
confused debate suggest otherwise is far too little in the way of
legislative history to overcome the language of the statute and the
explicit adoption of Title VI's words, which were not regarded as
extending to employment.

INFORMATION REQUESTED
1.

2.

Description of hiring process
a.

Person s involved in decision-making (by position); who
makes what decisions?

b.

Copy or established procedures; if not in writing, explain
how the process is communicated to the decision-makers
and to persons affected by it.

Description of criteria applied in hiring process
w~ight

a.

Nature, purpose and relative

of each criterion.

b.

A copy of written criteria; if not in writing, how are
criteria communicated to decision-makers and persons affected.

3.

Copy of employment application form for teaching positions.

4.

Copy of collective bargain contract{s) covering teachers for
period from January, 1976 to present.

5.

Copy of all policies relating to granting of leaves of absence.

6.

Copy of all policies relating to seniority and tenure.
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meb 12/10/81

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In Re:

Mary

No. 80-986, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, et. al.,
& Trumbull Board of Education v.

u.s.

Department

of Education & Potz

IV.

WHAT MATERIALS DID HEW REQUEST FROM THE SCHOOL BOARDS?
1.

North Haven.

The North Haven Board refused to rehire a

tenured teacher who had taken a one-year maternity leave. In the
subsequent investigation, HEW asked North Haven to provide specific
information concerning its policies on hiring, leaves of absence,
seniority, and tenure.

A xerox of the request is attached.

Rather

than respond, North Haven sought an injunction in DC.

2.

Trumbull.

A former guidance counselor in the Trumbull

public schools, Linda Potz, filed a charge that the Trumbull Board
gave her inferior job assignments, inferior working conditions, and
refused to renew her contract because of her sex.

HEW determined

that Trumbull had indeed violated Title IX by requiring Potz to type
and run errands not required of male counselors, by moving her
office to a smaller, poorly heated, and less comfortable space in
the gym away from the other counselors, by asking her to change a
report showing that she had seen many more students in a given week

2.

that the number seen by her male counterparts, and by not renewing
her contract, all on the basis of sex.
The record received by the Clerk's Office does not include
the DC proceedings for Trumbull.

The briefs give only no

description of the HEW investigation, only reporting that Trumbull
cooperated up to the point at which it received a letter from HEW
demanding Trunbull's agreement to HEW's remedial plan (which
included reinstating Potz) under threat of a fund cutoff.
point Trumbull sought declaratory relief.

At this

Without the record from

the DC, further details are unavailable.

V.

THE EEOC REGULATIONS AND THE SEC'Y's
There do not seem to be any significant differences between

the regulations.

Although the Sec•y requires that all pregnant

teachers be given unpaid leaves and the EEOC regulation does not,
the EEOC regulation provides that an an employer must give such
leaves (for disability) unless the policy does not have a disparate
impact on one sex and is justified by business necessity.

This

makes little sense given that only one sex can be subject ot the
disability, but, in any event, it seems unlike that such a policy
would be regarded by the EEOC as justified by business necessity in
the context of operating a school.

-rr_/_A.,
No. 80-986

, ~N~our±t~h~H~a~v~en~B~d~.~l~r.-SBe~lUl~--------~C~o*n~f~.~lh2H/~l~l,H'8Hl~---

The Chief Justice

~ ,e --.....c

-

~~4._;~~~...141

s 6-s- ~ .:...... ..r?.e... ,.e ~

£,.._ ~ ~ ~. f-..
,.~,...,.,....,...~

h

h-v

~

4

~ ~ 4ff1f!,f#~ ...... ...CC.....a/~

~~~GL4~~~

v-t;

Clfl ~

Justice Brennan

~~P-f4ft>l~~~
~ ~~-- 4-.-L~ ~. ~~ qt.. JJ~~$
~..... ~~ (...e..,,., ~ $4«' ~) ~,...C~ G~d'-c,...- ~
h ~ ~~ ~..., ...... ~.,.,~.

Justice White

?2fl ~

~ --zr:~-te~,~~~~
~;t:o ~~-a.- ~A.r~.
SG-

14-

~ ~ -s-c;.. J'-'<CA~ ~if,- ~.4z~ ~
~~~ L-c..Cc::-~' -l!.-c""""l ;;t .
d'.t:..r ~ ~ ~-d~,.C..Co£~-c ... A~

~M.~q~r-.

Justice Marshall

~~

~~IVj/JS

Justice Blackmun

22f1lA ~ -:

~ """- Zj.

· -.r•._ _

C/lz~ ~~.,_~~~

..... ,

~

~h. t.Z, ~ ~ Ck,-,L G4M......,~ c.- ~4~~4..,~
1:J!L 9 b I ~ t:f tJ 2.. 4-,A ~ ~ • ~. .. , , - -

~. t!Ut'LJ- c ~ ~~L~,.~
~t' ~ 4---~1&.( ..
C/1-r i.,._~~.

'¥-

c A 2-

~~tiL.- ~,h' ~~ D-(~/92.. ~ ~
~~ ~~ c~r1.c..t~J,.-f-

Justice Powell

~~

Justice Rehnquist

~ •

,

,

Ji'I~ ~ ~"' d~~ ,tc ~'?"--~~

ef'IJI/~42.. A-c.-~~ ~ ~

c /J :S

VI-

~M-.

~ •

Justice Stevens

.s~ "b ¥ -

.-A~""- 4 r~ Plz , ~

r ~:OC..

d&z-~~~4.~~,

'f~VIt• ~ :ZX: ~ ~.-y~ .... ~h~4--.
~~C,¥}~5-~-£~ ~~

~~.

Justice O'Connor

t1fi
J!f!:'

~

4v

<.c.

~

tC ,,f S'"'-

~~jA-~~

~f

.·
·.

,,

,.

·~

~ ·'' •/

"'
.,~·

•'

~u.prttttt <!fcnrl cf firr~h ~hm,G
'Jlfrur~ gl. <!J. 2.0~J!..;l
!
.'
·_.;

.

.. .

~-

j
.: - ~

CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE

w .. . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

December 11, 1981

_- ,v•

Dear Chief,

...

-............

RE:

No. 80-986

North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell

Harry has agreed to undertake the opinion for
the Court
.

'.

in this case .

I

1
I

Sincerely,

Wil~ennan,
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

Jr.

<lfouri ltf tqt ~b ~tatts
'Jfufri:ttghtn. ~. <!f. Zll.;t~~

~u.prnttt

j

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

February 11, 1982

RE:

No. 80-986 North Haven BOard of Education
v. Bell

Dear Lewis:
Would you be willing to take on a dissent in this ·
case?
Regards,

Justice Powell

a

.· ···J . ~

February 16 , 1982
~

P0-98~

De~r

h~

North

Have~

Boatrl of Education v. Bell

Chief:
I will he glad to try a dissent, although it will
h~fore I get to it .

somP. time

Sincerely ,

The

Chie~

Justice

1fp/~s

·.

.§lqlrtmt <!):ami: of tltt ~itth .§fzrltg

:.&glfinghm. ~. <!):.

20~~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/

March 16, 1982

Re:

80-986 - North Haven Board of Education
v. Bell

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,
\..

.

/ v,._

Justice Blackrnun
Copies to the Conference

···t
I'

··'

,.

<!Jou.rt of tlrt ~tb ~tafts
'lllaslyington. ~. <q:. 20~J!-~

;%u:.prtntt

I

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 16, 1982

Re:

No. 80-986 - North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

/./J1.
T.M.

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

March 16, 1.982

80-986 North Raven Board of Education v. Bell

Harry:
I am in dissent in this case,
will take some time.

an~

inten~

to write.

Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

'

·~

~/.

-

.§u:punu <!fonrl cf flrt ~b ~taft.t¥
~~!p:ttgto:n. ~. C!J. 211~'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE W ... J . BRENNAN , JR.

RE:

March 17, 1982

80-986

North Haven Board of Education v. Bell

Dear Harry:
I agree.
Sincerely,
I

Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

;:3lt.ttttmr (!fonrf of tl!r ~lttil.dt ;§tatr.S'

f.t'L"lyingum. p.

~· 2o~>t2

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

March 22, 1982

Re:

80-986 - North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell

Dear Harry,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

...
I

Justice Blackrnun
cprn

j

.$\uvrtutt Qill1lrt of tqt ~ni.ttlt .§tah.it'
'Wrur'qmgton, '[a. <!f. 21l~JI.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o ' CONNOR

Mar ch 22, 1982

Re: No. 80-896

I

North Haven Board of Education v. Bell

Dear Harry:
Although I find your opinion generally persuasive, I
have two related concerns. The first is footnote 25, which
suggests that the Department may investigate complaints of
discrimination in programs not receiving federal funds. The
second concern is footnote 29, which states that Title IX's
provisions may be applicable "when employment discrimination has
an adverse effect on federally funded programs or the
beneficiaries of such programs, or when federal funds are not
used directly to subsidize the institution's discriminatory
practices but release other funds that are then used in a
discriminatory fashion." The issues raised in these two
footnotes were not presented to this Court for decision, and I am
r~-luctant to join an opinion that effectively decides these
issues without the benefit of an underlying record and full
briefing.
Because neither of these footnotes is necessary to your
holding, would you consider deleting them from the opinion?
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference

.§upum.t

~tntrt

of tip• ~nUt~ j;tatte

'J)t~;u.liyin.gftm.l£1.

QJ.

2llc?'!-~

March 25, 1982

CHAMB ERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 80-986 - North Haven Board of Education v. Bell
Dear Sandra:
This is in response to your letter of March 22.
I do
not think that the two footnotes "effectively decide" the
issues.
I thought, instead, that they made clear the limits
of the opinion.
These footnotes, however, apparently
disturb you, and I therefore shall eliminate them.
A new
draft will be around shortly.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

I'

~nvr.cm.c ~llUrt

of t~.c 1lnitcb ,§itaf.e.£>

'J.lht.5lpngt.on, ~. (!}.

2.0,?'1-~

CHAMBERS 01'

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

March 29, 1982

No. 80-986

North Haven Board of Education
v. Bell

Dear Harry,
Please join me in the third draft of your
opinion.

.

Sincerely,

#

'·

Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference

:.':;.,..

~--~--------~~------------~~--------~--~

lfp/ss 04/07/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mary

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

OATF.:

80-986 North Haven

I have read with interest the first draft of
It is quite persuasive.
Part I is excellent.
Part II, addressing the legislative history, is a
bit difficult to follow.

This is understandable because the

2history itself is a bundle of ambiguities, and in reading
both the Court's opinion and your draft I find it difficult
to follow the references and interrelationship Titles VI,
VII and IX, and the sections thereof.

My suggestions

therefore, are tentative.
::.
..

'
:··· t
·.. ··
•,,_,i.

4,,.

,,

I have dictated the attached rider as a possible
~~

introductory paragraph in Part II.
sentence iQ II, is not clear to me.

The J?resent first
Oo we lose anything by

omitting the first paragraph altogether, and commencing
discussion of the legislative history with the paragranh
that begins at the bottom of page 6?
On page 7, you make a good point in reliance on
Chairman O'Hara's explanation of the background of Title IX • •
But I find the sentence beginning seven lines from the
bottom of page 7, unclear to one without a detailert
familiarity with all of this.

I am sure you had in mind

that the reader would be familiar in detail with the Court's

•'

...
opinion, but I think it best to make our dissent clear on
its face.
Bayh

Therefore, we should identify or describe the

am~ndment

before referring to it.

Moreover, it is not

entirely accurate to sav that §904 "stated that the entire
l3ayh amendment did not apply to emPloyment • • • "

This

requires some rephrasing, as a statute does not speak in
terms of a Senator's amendment.
I have suggested, in a rider, language changes in

the last paragraph of Part II.
Unless you have done so, you might take a look at
the amicus hrief filed by the Equal Employment Advisory
Council.

Although l have not reread it, my impression is

that it was quite helpful on the legislative history.
Finally, I have suggested - by a rider - a
somewhat different approach to our conclusion in Part III.
You should take a close look at my language.

I

have not

checked the accuracy of my statement.

L.F.P., ,Jr.
ss

/....

••

.

'

lfp/ss 04/07/82
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mary

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

April 7, 1982

80-986 North Haven
I have read with interest the first draft of your
dissent.

It is quite persuasive.
Part I is excellent.
Part II, addressing the legislative history, is a

bit difficult to follow.

This is understandable because the

history itself is a bundle of ambiguities, and in reading
both the Court's opinion and your draft I find it difficult
to follow the references and

interrelationshi~I,
-\

VII and IX, and the sections thereof.

My suggestions below,

therefore, are tentative.
I have dictated the attached rider as a possible
introductory paragraph in Part II.
sentence in II, is not clear to me.

The present first
Do we lose anything by

omitting the first paragraph altogether, and commencing
discussion of the legislative history with the paragraph
that begins at the bottom of page 6?
On page 7, you make a good point in reliance on
Chairman O'Hara's explanation of the background of Title IX.
But I find the sentence beginning seven lines from the
bottom of page 7, unclear to one without a detailed
familiarity with all of this.

I am sure you had in mind

that the reader would be familiar in detail with the Court's

i'

.
I•

2.

opinion, but I think it best to make our dissent clear on
its face.

Therefore, we should identify or describe the

Bayh amendment before referring to it.

Moreover, it is not

entirely accurate to say that §904 "stated that the entire
Bayh amendment did not apply to employment

"

This

requires some rephrasing, as a statute does not speak in
terms of a Senator's amendment.
I have suggested, in a rider, language changes in
the last paragraph of Part II.
Unless you have done so, you might take a look at
the amicus brief filed by the Equal Employment Advisory
Council.

Although I have not reread it, my impression is

that it was quite helpful on the legislative history.
Finally, I have suggested - by a rider - a
somewhat different approach to our conclusion in Part III.
You should take a close look at my language.
checked the accuracy of my statementf ,

L. F. P. , Jr.

ss

r

.~

~

t. ,

I

have not

.•.

~Pril
~ORTH

8, 1982

GINA-POW

To:

Mary

From:

LFP, Jr.

Subject:

80-986

North Haven Bd. v. Bell

We mentioned the absurdity of thinking that Congress
intended to add a third statute on sex discrimination.

We

miqht add a footnote that emphasizes some of the
consequences of havinq different statutes, administered by
different agencies, regulating the same private action.

At

the government level, there is a needless duplication of the
bureaucracy.

In this case, for example, the Department of

Education must maintain a staff of employees to enforce the
anti-discrimination responsibility.

These will be employees

wholly unrelated to the purpose of the Department of
Education, and duplicative - at least to some extend - to
the large staffs of EEOC and the Department of Labor.

From

the viewpoint of the educational institutions, they will be
subject to regulation and oversight by different departments
of government that may, or may not, have the same
regulations and standards, require the filing of the same
reports, etc.
Our footnote also could develop, in more detail than my
brief sentence or two, the contrast between the elaborate

~

.

•

h

2.

provisions of Title Vti and the absence of comparable
provisions in the Education Act, the contrast in remedies,
and - if I am ri.ght about it - the unwisdom and inequity of
putting off funds (or the threat thereof) because a single
person files a

discri~ination

charge.

And what if that

i.ndividual simultaneousJy moves under Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act).
I may be exaggerating these problems.

I do not recall

that they were addressed particularly in the briefs.

In

view of your greater familiarity with the statutes, what do
you think?

L'FP, Jr •

.,

·.

April 8, 1982
NORTH GINA-POW

To:

Mary

From:

LFP, Jr.

Subject:

80-986

North Haven Bd. v. Bell

We mentioned the absurdity of thinking that Congress
intended to add a third statute on sex discrimination.

We

might add a footnote that emphasizes some of the
consequences of having different statutes, administered by
different agencies, regulating the same private action.

At

the government level, there is a needless duplication of the
bureaucracy.

In this case, for example, the Department of

Education must maintain a staff of employees to enforce the
anti-discrimination responsibility.

These will be employees

wholly unrelated to the purpose of the Department of
Education, and duplicative - at least to some

exte~ - ~

the large staffs of EEOC and the Department of Labor.

From

the viewpoint of the educational institutions, they will be
subject to regulation and oversight by different departments
of government that may, or may not, have the same
regulations and standards, require the filing of the same
reports, etc.
Our footnote also could develop, in more detail than my
brief sentence or two, the contrast between the elaborate

',.

-2.

provisions of Title VII and the absence of comparable
provisions in the Education Act, the contrast in remedies,
and - if I am right about it - the unwisdom and inequity of

~ tting

off funds (or the threat thereof) because a single

person files a discrimination charge.

(And what if that

individual simultaneously moves under Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act) .
I may be exaggerating these problems.

I do not recall

that they were addressed particularly in the briefs.

In

view of your greater familiarity with the statutes, what do
you think?

LFP, Jr.

lfp/ss 04/15/82
~EMOR1\NnUM

TO:

Mary

FROM:

L~wis

DA't'E:

.April 15, 1982

F. Powell, Jr.

80-986 North Raven
I

have read your revised

~raft

of 4/14, and think

we are quite close to having a strong and well written
dissent.
I have done some light editing, and dictated three
short riders for Part II, with no intent to change its
substance.

I think you have written Part II quite

persuasively.
My only substantial revisions are in

~art

III,

where you largely adopted draft language that I suggested.
Thus, I was n?.\'ir it ing to some extent - and trying to improve
- what I previously gave you.
You will note in the margin on page 13 my
suggestion that the paragraph there be moved to an
appropriate place in Part II, as it relatec; directly to the
legislative history.
I have not tried to sort out the footnote::; in my
revisions of Part III, as you can do that better than !.
no not hesitate to edit my Part III revisions if
you think this desirable.

I want your judgment particularly

as to whether you think some of my language overstates our
argument.

,

,.

2.

On page 13 of his brief, the Solicitor General
refers to administrative remedies under Title IX in addition
to fund termination.

Are any of these relevant as compared

to the elaborate Title VII remedies?
On minor point:

The draft now refers

inconsistently, perhaps, to HEW and to Department of
Education.

Perhaps we could put a note at the outset to the

effect that the relevant department of government when Title

IX was enadted was HEW, and that its responsibilities under
Title IX were assumed by the DOP. when it was created.

We

could say that where appropriate references to HE'f7 should be
read as meaning Department of Educati.on from and after it

was created.
When you have incorporated my editing and changes,
unless you wish me to read any further changes,
that you qo to a printed Chambers draft.

read by your co-clf:'l:rks as well as

by

t.F.P., Jr.

ss

I

suggest

Tt then can be

you and me.

.inprtmt <!j:ltltrl d tqt ~tb .itattg
jirultingtott, ~. <!J. 2llbi'l-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 22, 1982
Re:

No. 80-986

North Haven Board of Education v. Bell

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely,~

}J
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~lqlTmt:t

<!Jonrl .of tlrt 'Jlfuitt~ .§taft

~as!ringtan.

;!B.

cq.

ZO?.l!~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 23, 1982
Re:

No. 80-986 - North Hav~n Board of Education v.
Bell, Secretary, Dept. of Education

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I am not ready on this case for Wednesday ·release.
listed as "tentative" in my earlier memo.

It was

Regards,

cc:

Mr. Stevas
Mr. Goldstraw

·.

April 29, 1982
PERSONAL
80-986 North Haven v. BelJ

Dear Chief:
When we ~entioned Nort~ Haven earli~r this
afternoon, I had totally forgotten that on February 11 you
assigned to me the task of writing a dissent.
You and I were the only dissenters at Conference,
and I have assumed that you were still wt th me. tH 11
Rehnquist voted with the majority at ConferPnce, but he was
persuaded by my dissent, and haq ioined it. If there are
statements in the dissent that give you difficulty, I would
be happy to ~iscuss them.
It may be ~hen W@
confusion as to Hydro level,
circulated a strong dissent
rather hoped you would join
tentatively "the other way"

werP talktnq that there was

another ("J\2 case in whi.ch I
from Harry's Court opinion and
Me. rn Hydrolevel you voted
at Confer.ence.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

t\•

'

.....

·'

•.·

~

·'
.

~-

'

........

I.

tlrt

,§ttprmtt C!Jrotrl of
~ ~ ~ta:f.tg
~rurfringwn. gt. <q. 2!1~'!$
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 29, 1982

Re:

80-986 - North Haven Board of Education v. Bell

Dear Lewis:
Please JOln me ln your dissenting oplnlofr ln this case.

Justice Powell
Copies of the Conference

r

•,,·

l

.§u:prmtt Qftmrl nf tq.t ~nit.dl .§tahs~aslp:nghrn.

1E. <!f.

2llgiJ!.$

CHAMB E RS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

!April 29, 1982
Re:

No. 80-986 -North Haven

Bo~rd

of Education v. Bell

Dear Harry:
I continue to have problems with the breadth of
the opinion and I will try to have a concurring draft
out early next week when the "crunch" eases· up.
Regards,

Justice Blackmun
Copi~s

lI
l

I
I
l

to the Conference -

~

~" r~ ~!k frJ- 1~ I 0
~ ?-1-- IS""~ dj ~

4:>
J-u-<_.....,

~ .a... ~ ~I

meb 05/04/82

t.v--e

4Z-~-

~

~ 4J.k..~ J-o ~ c;:f:

To: Mr. Justice

From:

Mary

Pow~ll

/4

~

t!?j .-n. 2 G,

/1 )'f(J
~ 1-o ~~?~f-TTT l 1"4

~ ~

~ rrsJt> Hc..L

<jf

j-4-£-h-Yr

(~ 2.~.l

~ ~

~~~~~~~~-

No. 80-986, North Haven v. Bell

In Re:

d-'JI'--c..}r2.t-r

~ ~

H...,J- ~ ~ ~ ~...&..,. r~·-e. ~
~- ~:r . ~d.d~S:.-s••-L"'~~ ~
I don't think the new version of North Haven touches us.

~'(

I

~ ~-<2-'1

would not add anything in response because I think any response
~
~~~A...>~-~~
would only detract from the streng ~ of our arguments.
(Their new
circulation and our

d~t~e~~· ~~J?

The changes they make that you might want to respond to are

-

footnotes 10 and 15.

Note 10 unfairly uses our argument about the

ease with which the statute could have been written more clearly and
uses it to buttress their reading by acting as if the statute only
consists of the word "person."

(if you want, we could make this

point in a footnote.)

Note 15 tries to save one of their arguments based on one

--------->

of Senator Bayh's statements by arguing that the inclusion of §1005
in the particular sentence quoted was inadvertant (on the part of
the Senator) •

We could add a note stating that the ambiguous

references to employment discrimination and Title IX could equally
well be inadvertant (as the CAs have found) given that all
place on the floor and it is clear that Senator Bayh was confused

-~

-

2.

about the exact scope of the various provisions of his amendment.
In other words, there is no evidence to tell us which parts of his
remarks were inadvertant.
But I would not respond to this argument at all because its
weakness is apparent on its face.

The Court is relying almost

entirely on three statements, none of which is free of ambiguity.
If parts are also "inadvertant," one would think little weight
should be placed on the statements in the absence of any more
concrete evidence of which parts are inadvertant.

meb 05/10/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Mary

In Re:

Suggested responses in No. 80-986, North Haven v. Bell

1.

Suggested new footnote to be called at end of first

§ III, in response to last

~

~

in

of n. 26 of Court opinion, at 24.

The Court maintains that by considerating these factors, we
"second-guess" Congress, substituting our view for that of Congress.
See n. 26, ante at

. But we ordinarily presume that Congress acts

in a reasonable manner.

See xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (cite to an opinion by

Justice Stewart that states this--the library knows that it exists,
'

and we should get the cite tomorrow when Steve Parken returns).
This is a traditional rule of statutory construction based on the
presumption that Congress, like other legislative bodies, usually
does not act unreasonably in enacting legislation.

See 2A

c.

Sands,

Sutherland Statutory Construction, §456.12, at 38 (4th ed. 1973).
Any

ambiguity in the statutory language--such as the Court

apparently concededs, ante at ___ , should be resolved in light of
this presumption of reasonableness.
Any argument that the statute unambiguously supports the
Court's position--and consideration of the reasonableness of various
interpretations of the statute therefore should be avoided in

2.

deference to a decision made by Congress--would be difficult given
the history of the issue at the appellate level.

Twelve judges on 4

Courts of Appeals thought that the plain language of the statute
indicated that the statute did not ban employment
se.

See text at

and n. 6, ante.

discrimination~

Six judges on two Courts

of Appeals thought the language of the statute ambiguous in at least
some respects.

See n. 6, supra.

And, although 18 judges considered

the statute language at the appeallate level, not a single one
thought that the statute unambiguously banned employment
discrimination per se in federally funded programs.

2.

Suggested addition (new ~) at end of n. 12, at 9, in
f1~ lb a:st- t3
u
response to ~a•t ~of 26 ~ of the ~ t opinion ..

The majority discounts this point because the inclusion of
§1005 in this statement was "inadvertant."
firm proof that such was the case.

There is, of course, no

Perhaps the Senator only

included the statement about employment discrimination being banned
in federally-funded programs because, under Title VII as amended by
§1005 of the Bayh Amendment, such discrimination would now be banned
in all educational programs, including federally-funded ones.
Moreover, if parts of the Senator's remarks were
inadvertant, how are we to know which ones were intented and which
inadvertant?

Perhaps the inadvertant statements were those that the

Court reads as implying that employment discrimination per se is
banned by Title IX.

Most of the Courts of Appeals considering the

3.

question have agreed with the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit's assessment of the legislative history:
"While it is true that there were occaisional lapses
during the discussions, wherein one of the senators would
telescope the sections [of the Bayh Amendment] , thereby
suggesting that employment was to be covered under ••.
Title IX, a careful examination of the debates •.• lead[s]
us to conclude that these were the product of the
imprecision of oral discussion rather than a reflection
that the Act intended section 901 of Title IX to embrace
progibitions against sex discrimination in employment."
Islesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 428
(1979) •
See also, e.g., Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 995, cert.
denied sub nom., Seattle University v. HEW, 44 ~4
In

u.s.

972 (1972).

Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581, 585, cert.

denied, 444

u.s.

972 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit concluded that the legislative history actually argued
against extending Title IX to prohibit employment discrimation-noting, for example, that Senator Bayh had commented that the
remedies under Title VII are "extremely effective."

Id., at 585

(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)).

3.

Suggested new footnote at end of first sentence on p.

12, responding to n. 10 of the Court's opinion.

The Court

sents our point in stating that the

statute should be

o cover employment discrimination

because Congress could so easil
"person."

See n. 10, ante.

use a word other than

The

the word "person," nor does it proscribe

does not consist solely of
rsons."

Rather, it

prohibits certain form of discrimination against persons, and the

4.

question presented is whether
one of the kinds of discri

ployrnent discrimination per se is

nation prohibited by Title IX.
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.I
DRAFT:

NO. 80-

, North Haven Board of Education v.
Be 11 , e t • a 1 • ,

& Trumbull Board of Education

~'

~

f

Dept. of Education

&

v.

u.

S.

Potz

POWELL, J., dissenting.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20

u.s.c.

§1681

et

seq.,

prohibits

discrimination

on

the

I
basis

of

sex

in

education

receiving federal funds.

programs

and

activities

Pursuant to this prov1s1on, the

~ .W•~J~{!-IEW)
Department
prohibiting

of 1\

Educatio ~

discrimination

b-as
on

employment by fund recipients.
Today,

the

regulations,
legislative

Court
relying
history,

upholds
on
and

the

promulgated
the

basis

3 4 C. F. R.
the

gender

in

§106. 51 {a) {1) •

validity

statutory

several

of

~ ltf7!>regulations

of

these

language,

post-enactment

its

events.

1

2.

Because

I

believe the Court's

interpretation is neither

consistent with the statutory language nor compelled by

?
(

its legislative history, I dissent. 1

I

Although the majority begins with the language of
the

statute,

it

entirety only
In

the

Court

paraphrases
suggesting
language
Court,
may

considering

two

the
an

used

the

relevant

language

in

its

in the opening paragraphs of the opinion.

section
quotes

quotes

words

rest of

the

statute's

of

the

the

relevant

statute

meaning,

the

and

language,

thereby

interpretation actually at odds with

the

in

the

the

statute.

Thus,

according

to

"[s]ection 90l's broad directive that 'no person'

be

appears,

discriminated
on

students.".

its

face,

against
to

on

include

the

basis

of

gender

employees as well as

~~~~~~M..e
Ante, at_.~ 4-/-L~~~.

1 Even the majorty states that the post-enactment
events
it
discusses
only
"lend
credence"
to
its
interpretation of the statute. Ante, at

3.

In relevant part, the statute actually states:
"No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance
" §901 {a) .
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in,
or the beneficiaries of, programs or activities receiving
federal

funding.

Congress

to

It

strains

conclude

the

that

language

not

only

chosen

teachers

by
and

administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are
discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment,
are

thereby

activity 2 ;
activity;

{i)
{i i)

or

denied

participation

in

a

program

or

denied

the

of

a

program

or

{iii)

subject

benefits
(_.J.t..

to

disrminination

"

education

under

M~

an

program or activity.
llll.Q,. although /f Congress
~
made no reference ~ to employers or employees in Title IX,

""/'iif4v
~~~-to e:2~~Ait has bee-n quit ;~. explicfit..J ln other - ~ atut e's - regulating
employment practices. 3

It is noteworthy that not one of the six Courts
of Appeals ) considering the question before us) has reached
the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by
the statutory language.
the Court of Appeals for
School Committee v.

The issue was presented first to
the First Circuit in Islesboro

Califano,

593 F.

2d 424,

426

{CAl),

2I
agree with
the majority that employees who
directly participate in a federal program, i.e., teachers
who receive federal grants, are, of course, protected by
Title IX. See ante , at
3 See, e.g., 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2 {Title VII: "[i]t
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-"); 29 u.s.c. §206 {d)
{Equal Pay Act: "[n]o employer
having employees ••.. ").

v

4.

cert denied,

444

u.s.

972

(1979), and that decision has

been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider
the

question.

There,

the

court

concluded

language of section 901, 20

u.s.c.

§1681, on its face, is

aimed at the beneficiaries of
either

students attending

that

"[t]he

the federal monies,

i.e.,

institutions receiving federal

funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded
by the United States government."

The court went on to

point out that this reading of "the plain language of the
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific
exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate
to students, not employees.
decision,
(CA6),

Ibid. 4~n

Romeo Community Schools v.

cert

denied,

444

u.s.

972

the next appellate

HEW,

(1979),

600 F.
the

2d 581

Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the interpretation

~~/

fJt#W'

of the statute relied on by the Hlajor:bty, noting that "as

"

actually written, the statute is not nearly so broad.
words

'no person'

are modified

clearly limits their meaning."
the

statute

"reaches

..

only

by

later

The

language which

The court concluded that

those

~~
1\ not
only

types

of

disparate

'd
.
f1n
s
th1s
point
unconvincing, but concludes that the
"absence of a
specifc exclusion for employment among the list of
exceptions
tends
to
support the Court of Appeal's
conclusion that Title IX does protect employees." Ante,
at
(citation omitteg}.
I am unable to follow this
reasonin • ! ~ agree th~~he absence of employment-related
except1ons is~ conclusive proof that employment is not
within the scope of the statute since Congress may have
intended to cover all employment.
But I fail to see how
that absence affirmat1vely indicates that the statute was
meant to apply to employees.
Indeed, if Congress did
intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not
provide exceptions similar to those in Title VII--for
example, Title VII does not proscribe bona fide seniority
plans, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2(h), or preferential employment
practices for
Indians with regard to establishments
operating on or near reservations, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2(i).
~

5.

~
treatment"

W'fli:eh A. involve

discrimination

against

program

beneficiaries. 5

II

egislative histroy of Title IX.

at

5 The question has also been presented to the
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits.
In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CAS), cert. denied, 444 u.S.
972 (1972)
the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" the Court o.r:~-(},_AAppeals for the First Circuit's decision in
oro. An /~
in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993 (CA9 ~---1980), cert granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v.
Seattle Univ., 449 u.s. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of
~d. Appeals for the "'Bi~Rbh Circuit followed the three earlier
circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had
held that the plain language of Title IX did not support
HEW's position.
Even the decision below, in which the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
regulations, the court did not base its decision on the
statutory language, but stated that the "language is more
ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777.
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Ctty. School
System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 (CAS 1980), cert pending
sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty School System, No. 80-1023.
There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund
termination to the offending program or activity.
In
reaching this decision, the court noted that programspecific
regulations
might
be
sustainable
in
some
instances, e.g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay
against female teachers paid with federal funds relative
c::---""' to the amounts paid male teachers with federal funds. As
noted by
¢ourt.>- of Appeals for the E.ifth Circtlit, an
argument can be maae that in such a cas
the the woman
teacher is "denied the benefits
bject to
discrimination under" the feder
Butl\ i.t is ' by
that
·
.,.G if'c\1i-t would agree with the ma-je;r i ty that the statutory
language
would
support
rogram-specific
regulations ~----fibi ting
all
kinds
f
discriminatory
employment
~
practices w1
to
11 types of employees, i.e.,
secretaries and administra
as well as teachers.

, ~~~~~~~, £J he
1970.

?

J

earliest version of Title IX appeared in

~

ve~sion~ finally

Like the

enacted, the 1970 proposal

would have amended Title VI I of the Ci vi 1 Rights Act of
1964 as well as the Equal Pay Act to E xplici tly l prohibit
discrimination in employment in educational institutions.
See

12,

n.

ante.

In

addition,

this

proposal

original

}\ would have1 s implX} added the word "sex" to Title VI of the
Civil

Rights

Act of 1964,

42

u.s.c.

which then

§2000d,

would have prohibited discrimination in federally funded
programs or

activities on

the

basis of

"race,

color,

ante.

If Title VI had been amended,

or

national

Title IX enacted,
change
funded

banned

See

n.

as

well

12 at

rather

as

__,

than a new

it could not have been argued that the

employment

programs;

origin."

sex

Title VI

discrimination

in

federally

includ~/\~g

proviso

stating that it covers only discrimination against program
beneficiaries,

not

employees.

See

Title

VI,

§604,

42

..., U • S • C • § 2 0 0 Od- 3 • 6

was

In 1972, the version finally enacted as Title IX
jJ /- ~ r.-·-..,·.~
introduced into the Senate.
The model for this

'

provision [.:.emaine~ Tile VI, 7 but it ' was drafted as a new
statute, Title IX, to be codified at 20

6 42

u.s.c.

u.s.c.

§1682 et

§2000d-3 states:

"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall
be construed to authorize action under this
subchapter by any department or agency with
respect to any department or agency or labor
organization except where a primary objective of
the Federal financial assistance is to provide
employment."

/

0-

7The oper~ ive language in the two provisions is
virtually identical.
Compare 42 u.s.c. §2000d {Title VI)
with 20 u.s.c. §168la {Title IX).

I?

7.

seq.,

rather

reason

for

than

this

supporters

as

modification of Titl

change

was

that

if

feared

amendment,

a

Title VI

strategic,
Title

The

not

VI

itself would be

for
in da

"gutted" on the floor of the Congress.

er of being

Sex

iscrimination

Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Education and Labor, House of Representativ s--Review of
regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
[

p. 409 (1975).
Moreover,

the

House

version

of

Title

IX

originally contained a provision, §904, equivalent to §604
of

Title

VI,

explicitly

stating

that

Title

----

se~

apply to discrimination in employment per
the Court, ante at

But

the Conference.
Subcommittee

on

Representative

IX did

not

As noted by

..

, this provision was eliminated by
AA-t- ~r---~ .r
in 19 7 5 hear i gs before the House
'\

Postsecondary

O'Hara,

Education

Chairman

of

that

and

Labor,

Subcommittee,

while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness,
noted that this change was
eliminate

a

drafting

error

mad~

at conference simply to

with

as

little

trouble

as

possible. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House
of

Representatives--Review

Title IX,

of

94th Cong., 1st Sess.

regulations
p.

409

to

implement

(1975).

Section

904 stated that the entire Bayh amendment did not apply to
employment--but

of

course,

the

Bayh

amendment

included

~

changes

~

Title VI I

and the Equal Pay Act

in order to

prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in employment.
Since the analogous provision of Title VI
regarded

as

a

mere

clarification, 8

the

(§604) had been

-rr~

is on

Footnote(s) 8 will appear on following pages.

7

-·
8.

~ weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's
use

of

the

indicates a
Cannon v.

when

ritualistic

words

substantive change.

provision

to be

Title

House

441

u.s.

677,

CoR~<ess~expected

IX,

receeded"

As this Court noted in

University of Chicago,

~d

"the

770-711,

the

new

interpreted consistently with Title VI,

which had been used as its model.9
In arguing that the legislative history indicates
Title

IX

intended

was

discrimination,

to

m~

the

statements of a single senator.
at

extend
relies

to

employment

heavily

The first

on

st ~meAt,

(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)),

three
ante

is !, ~

state ~ ~
~
faculty employment will be covered by his amendment after

ambiguous.

It

~s

..true

tht!t

Senator

Bayh

mentioning the provision enacting Title IX but prior to
any mention of the provisions amending Title VII and the
Equal

Pay

Act.

Btlt

Dayfi ] mmediately

thereafte~tate~

v

~

that Title IX's enforcement powers parallel those in Title
VI--and Title VI has never provided for

fund termination

to redress discrimination in employment.

Next, the Court

quotes Bayh's statements that

(i)

he regarded

"sections

8 See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964)
(statement
of Attorney General Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on
H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. p. 198 (1964)
(statement of Congressman Celler,
House Floor Manager of Title VI).
1 ~ . uL
~~r~--~ 9 The Court cites th se same pages in Cannon for the
proposition that it is C ngress's intent in 1972, not 1964
(when Title VI was passed) that is determinative here.
Ante at
.
This is, of course, true.
But the point
J
made by t1i"'e Cannon Co rt was that when Congress passe6_.r ~ f.tlltl.
Title IX, it p'ssHme-d i tle IX would mean what Title VI
-~
appeared to mean in 19 2. This aspect of Cannon support~
m;r dissent, A~ the
·
'
, s1nce
r~
does not suggest that t
thought
VI applied to employmen
per se.

~~

~
~A:f1A ,· ~u

ie. ~ ~-/-!

~

~~~+-1-c>
/..-.. 7
~~-

9.

1001-1005"

as

"[c]entral

to

[his]

amendment"

and

(ii)

"[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in
all

areas,"

118

Cong.

amendment

including employment.
Rec.

is

5807

the

(1972)) .

section

Ante at

But,

amending

(quoting

§100 5 of
Title

VII

the

Bayh

and

thus

§§1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of
whether

Title

IX

does.10

Moreover,

the

Court

uses

an

elipsis rather than include the following words from the
second Bayh statement:
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of
federally assisted programs and activities is
already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition
does not apply to discrimination on the basis of ·
sex.
In order to close thi~ loophole, my
amendment sets fohth prohibition and enforcement
provisions
wh~h
generally
parallel
the
provisions of title VI."
118 Cong. Rec. 5807
(1972) (in elipses ante at __).
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that
he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title
it.

VI rather than as a substantial departure from J~~
In the third Bayh statement, ante at

(quoting

118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator is responding to
a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the
~
~
assumes that each sentence in that response
"\.
refers to Title IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit noted in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy .•. , as
well as the discussion immediately preceding and
following the above-quoted passage, indicates
that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into
three sections, two of which were specificatlly
aimed at students (admissions and services) , the
third at employees (employment). While Senator
Bayh's · response was more extended than it needed
10 In
Bayh's
amendment,
§§1001-1004
address
discrimination in federally funded programs: §1001 is
Title IX.
Section 1005 amends Title VII, and §§1009 &
1010 amend the Equal Pay Act. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972).
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118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator is responding to
a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the
~
~
assumes that each sentence in that response
'\
refers to Title IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit noted in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy •.• , as
well as the discussion immediately preceding and
following the above-quoted passage, indicates
that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into
three sections, two of which were specificatlly
aimed at students (admissions and services) , the
third at employees (employment) • While Senator
Bayh's · response was more extended than it needed
10 In

Bayh's
amendment,
§§1001-1004
address
in federally funded programs: §1001 is
Title IX.
Section 1005 amends Title VII, and §§1009 &
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~iscrimination

10.

to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell' s
quetion, we think HEW's reading is strained. We
think this particularly in light of the fact
that the discussion was an oral one and thus not
as prescise as a response in written form, •••. "
59 3 F • 2d , a t 4 2 7 •

~~ii
Rider B, p. 10 (North Haven)
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/

NORTHlOA SALLY-POW
Rather than support the court's view, it is fair
to say that the legislative history accords with the

/

natural reading of the statute.

III

~~

The
/

supporter
In the

majority

of a

past~

has

allowed

statute to determine

statements
its

of

one

interpretation.

this Court has held that "[t]he remarks of a

legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling
legislative
441

u.s.

281,

history."
311

Chrysler

{1979).

The

Corp.

v.

majority

nevertheless
ambiguity

relies on such remarks,
ignoring their
~~
and the).. Senato :_c :fail ~ to understand the

differences between his amendment and its model, because
the legislation is the result of a floor amendment and the
Senator's remarks are "the only authoritative indications
of congressional intent regarding the scope" of Title IX.
Ante, at

Because I consider the statutory language

authoritative,

I

dissent.

As Justice Jackson warned

in

Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384,, 395-

11.

96

(1951)

statements

(Jackson,
from

J.,

floor

concurring),

debates,

"to

select casual

not always

distinguished

for candor or accuracy, as a basis for making up our minds
what

law

ourselves

Congress
for

functions •..• "'

the

intended
Congress

to
in

enact
one

is
of

to
its

substitute
important

'

.

'

.
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NORTHlO SALLY-POW
III
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of
§90l(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:
(Mary, here repeat the langauge you have on p. 3
of your draft identing it).

The Court concludes that this language must be read to
proscribe sex discrimination in employment by educational
institutions that receive financial assistance under Title
IX.

I submit that no lawyer, asked to read the foregoing

language alone, would think it had anything to do with the
employment practices of schools.

An employee of a school

is not thought of as "participating in, or denied the
benefits of" an "education program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance".

There could be part time

2.

. .
employees who also participated in such a program, but
that is not what the Court holds today.

The respondents

who initiated these cases are two women seeking full time
reemployment, and neither claims to being a participant in
or to receive benefits of federal funding except in the
tangential way that federal funds may aid the recipient
schools in meeting general operating expenses.
If the draftsmnn of Title IX, and particularly
of §901 - presumably one or more lawyers - had been
instructed to include sex discrimination in employment, it
cannot be argued seriously that the language of this
section would have been written as above set forth.

And

whatever the skills of the draftsman may have been, the
precedents of the anti-discrimination language in Titles
VI and VII, presumptively would provided models for the

3.

. .

§901 language •

We thus have a situation where the Court,

presumably to reach a result deemed desirable, puts common
sense aside and undertakes an elaborate examination of an
ambiguous legislative history to conclude that after all
Congress meant something it had not said.
Apart from statements of one supporter of Title
IX, there is no substantial legislative history that
supports the Court's interpretation.*

*Mary, you might add a footnote here discounting as
essentially irrelevant the Court's reliance on postenactment history.

4•

. .

..

The most dependable sources of legislative
intent are the reports of the responsible committees.
Nothing in either of these reports lends support to the
Court's conclusion.

Indeed, the Senate rejected a version

of Title IX introduced by Senator McGovern, that would
have expanded the bill specifically to include employment
practices.

The Court, in light of this legislative

record, was forced to rely almost exclusively on
fragmentary statements by one supporter of the statute.
We previously have emphasized that "[t]he remarks of a
single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling
in analyzing legislative history.
Brown, 441

Chrysler Corp. v.

u.s. 281, 311 (1979).
It seems to me that the Court also disregards

the single most relevant evidence of what a reasonable

..

,,..,.

5.

..
..

legislative body would have intended.

There was no need

to enact another statute proscribing employment
discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of
sex.

Title VII and the Equal Pay Act had already met

fully this legislative need.*

*Mary - if as I recall the SG conceded the reespondents
had remedies available under Title VII, add a note.

6•

..
..

Moreover, Title IX was to be administered by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Title VII

and the Equal Pay Act were administered by the Department
of Labor and EEOC.

It seems beyond rational belief that

Congress would have intended not only duplicative
legislation but then placed its enforcement in the hands
of a different department of government.

Speaking of

enforcement, Title VII - a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute - contains carefully prescribed
procedures for conciliation, for oversight by EEOC, and
finally for federal court remedies.

This structured

procedure is to be contrasted with the only remedy - an
overkill type of remedy - provided by Title IX:

the

cutting off of funds, thereby penalizing innocent people.
The District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438

'

'

J

7.

..
'

.

F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd 600 F.2d 581 (CA6)
cert. den., 44

u.s.

972 (1979), correctly observed:

(Mary: Copy here the quote from Romeo I
reprinted on page 104 of petitioner's brief.)

The Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the
federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the
Romeo Court thought was self evident:
"The Department of Education has only limited
expertise in employment matters. Its view is
that employment cases are better resolved under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
provides more appropriate remedies for such
cases." Brief, p. 37.

In sum, the Court's decision today is predicated
on three assumptions that I am unwilling to impute to
Congress:

(i) that it was incapable or neglgected, to

state with any degree of clarity what a first year law
student should have been able to state, (ii) that it
enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in

8.

'

.

the absence of any showing of a need therefor, and (iii)
finally, that it vested the authority to enforce of the
third statute in the Department of Education that
concededly lacks the experience and the qualifications to
oversee and enforcement employment legislation.
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Moreover, Title IX was to be administered by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Title VII

and the Equal Pay Act were administered by the Department
of Labor and EEOC.

It seems beyond rational belief that

Congress would have intended not only duplicative
legislation but then placed its enforcement in the hands
of a different department of government.

Speaking of

enforcement, Title VII - a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute - contains carefully prescribed
procedures for conciliation, for oversight by EEOC, and
finally for federal court remedies.

This structured

procedure is to be contrasted with the only remedy - an
overkill type of remedy - provided by Title IX:

the

cutting off of funds, thereby penalizing innocent people.
The District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438

7.

F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd 600 F.2d 581 (CA6)
cert. den., 44

u.s. 972 (1979), correctly observed:

(Mary: Copy here the quote from Romeo I
reprinted on page 104 of petitioner's brief.)

The Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the
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Romeo Court thought was self evident:
"The Department of Education has only limited
expertise in employment matters. Its view is
that employment cases are better resolved under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
provides more appropriate remedies for such
cases." Brief, p. 37.

In sum, the Court's decision today is predicated
on three assumptions that I am unwilling to impute to
Congress:

(i) that it was incapableAor neglgected, to

state with any degree of clarity
SJ:P~]d

whatA~~'~ ~ ~J

R-a-ve ee-en able t o....., st:....a-te, (ii) that it

enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in

·.

8.

of any showing of a need therefor, and (iii)
it vested the authority to enforce ~ the
third statute in the Department of Education that
concededly lacks the experience and the qualifications to
oversee and

enforce~ t

employment legislation.
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HAVENS SALLY-POW
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that §901 of
Title IX "does not expressly include . • • employees".

It

relies on the negative fact that neither does §901
"exclude employees from its scope".

Ante, at 9.

The

Court then turns to the "legislative history for evidence
as to whether or not §901 was meant to prohibit employment
discrimination".

Id.

I agree with the several Courts of

Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the
statutory language cannot fairly be read to proscribe
employee discrimination.

Only rarely may legislative

'

~

history be relied upon to read into a statute substant4a±
language that Congress itself did not include.
the legislative history must show clearly and

At least,

2

0

unequivocally that Congress did intend what it failed to
say.

The Court's elaborate exposition of the history of

Title IX and especially §901 falls far short of satisfying
this standard.

"•

•

1-1'1 )
.
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/

HAVENlO SALLY-POW
The Court's decision today is another example of
reaching to obtain a result perceived to be desirable.
jJ-

/

In
._;

doing so, it largely ignored the language of the statute
itself, and relied upon HEW's strained interpretation of
this language.

In doing so, it rejected the views of six

courts of Appeals - each of which had concluded that HEW's
regulation could not be reconciled with the statutory
language.
history.

The Court turned for support to the legislative
There is not a word in the reports of either the

Senate or House that suggests that Title IX was an
additional statute intended to prohibit discrimination in
employment.

(Mary, am I right about this?)

But comfort

was found in statements on the floor of the Senate by a

,,·;·"'-'}.

2.

sponsor of Title IX, Senator Bayh, that - as indicated
above - at least are ambiguous if not indeed reflecting
misunderstanding.

We held that "[t)he remarks of a single

legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in
analyzing legislative history".
441

u.s.

281, 311 (1979).

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,

Moreover, there was no reason

for Congress to include anti-discrimination provisions
within Title IX, a statute that addressed an entirely
different purpose.

Other statutes, then on the books,

were specifically enacted to proscribe employment
discrimiantion in all of its aspects.

In addition to

Titel VI, the comprehensive legislation is Title VII that
also contains carefully prescribed procedures for
conciliation, for oversight by the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commissions, and finally for federal court

!

3.

remedies.

Counsel for the government conceded, at oral

argument, that the discrimination alleged in this case was
within the jurisdiction of Title VII and all of its
remedies.

The Court today offers no explanation of why

the Congress may have wished to provide duplicative
legislation, especially as a "tag on" to a statute with an
entirely different purpose.

Moreover, the only remedy

provided for a violation of Title IX is the cutoff of
federal funds to the educational institution - a drastic
remedy penalizing innocent people and one hardly designed
as appropriate for alleged discrimination in the failure
by each of two schools, petitioners in this case, to
reemploy a single individual.
In sum, today's decision of this Court supplies
both language in and a purpose to the statute not made

·'

4.

.

'

clear by Congress, or for which any need can be imagined
in light of specific legislation dealing carefully and
broadly with employment discrimination.

As it seems to me

that restraint appropriate to the Judicial Branch is
absent in today's decision, I dissent.

'

'

DISS

MARYB-POW

meb 04/14/82
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POWELL, J., dissenting.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20

u.s.c.

§1681

basis

of

et

sex

seq.,
in

prohibits

education

discrimination

programs

and

Ptrr-suant to

Department

Education,

of

Health,

promulgated regulations

~ft. C 975

~ is

and

the

activities

..Rreceiving federal funds.

on

147s-

provisioR;;\ the
Welfare

(HEW}

prohibiting discrimination

on the basis of gender in employment by fund recipients.
34

C.F.R.

§106.51 (a} (1}.

validity of
language,

these

its

Today,

regulations,

legislative

the

Court

relying on

history,

and

upholds

the

the

statutory

several

post-

2.

enactment

events.

interpretation

is

Because
neither

consistent with

nor ~y

language

believe

I

its

the
the

Court's
statutory

history,

legislative

I

dissent.l

I

Although the majority begins with the language of
the

statute,

it

entirety only
In

the

quotes

the

relevant

language

in

its

in the opening paragraphs of the opinion.

section

considering

the

statute's

meaning,

the

Court quotes two words of the statute and paraphrases the
rest,
odds

thereby
with

the

suggesting
language

according to the Court,

an

interpretation

used

in

the

actually

statute.

at

Thus,

"[s]ection 90l's broad directive

that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the basis
of gender appears, on its face,
well as students."

Ante, at

to

include employees as

This is not

-------,,-&.C~ ~~~

~

what

lEv-en- 1 he 1\--ma~o:rity staee~ that the post-enactment
events
it
discusses
only
"lend
credence"
to
its
interpretation of the statute. Ante, at

3

0

the statutory language provides.
In relevant part, the statute

«e~ ~ lly

states:

"No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance
" Education Amendments of 1972, §90l(a}, 20
u.s.c. §1681 (a}.
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in,
or the beneficiaries of, programs or activities receiving
lD~
federal funding.
It ~raiR5 the language chosen by
Congress

to

conclude

that

not

only

teachers

and

administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are
discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment,
are

thereby

activity 2 ;
activity;

(i}
(ii}

or

denied

participation

in

a

program

or

denied

the

of

a

program

or

(iii}

subject

education program or activity.

benefits
to

discrimination

under

an

Moreover, Congress made no

reference whatever to employers or employees in Title IX,

~

in contrast to quite explict language

in other statutes

"

regulating employment practices. 3
It is noteworthy that not one of the six Courts
of Appeals to consider the question before us has reached
the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by
the statutory language.

The issue was presented initially

2I
agree with
the majority
that employees who
directly participate in a federal program, i.e., teachers
who receive federal grants, are, of course, protected by
Title IX. See ante , at
3 see, e.g., 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i)t
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-"}; 29 u.s.c. §206 (d) (1} (Equal Pay Act: "[n)o employer
having employees ...• "}.

4.

to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro
School Committee v.
cert denied,

444

Califano,

u.s.

972

593 F.

(1979),

2d 424,

426

(CAl),

and that decision has

been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider
the

question.

the

court

concluded

language of section 901, 20

u.s.c.

§1681, on its face, is

aimed at
either

the

There,

that

"[t]he

beneficiaries of the federal monies,

students attending

i.e.,

institutions receiving federal

funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded
by the United States government."

The court went on to

point out that this reading of "the plain language of the
statute

is buttressed by an examination of the specific

exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate
to students, not employees. 4

Ibid.

In the next appellate decision,

Romeo Community

Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert denied, 444
972

(1979),

the Court of Appeals

for

the

u.s.

Sixth Circuit

rejected the interpretation of the statute now relied on
by

this

Court,

noting

that

statute is not nearly so broad.

"as

actually

written,

the

The words 'no person' are

Court
today
not
only
finds
this
point
unconvincing, but concludes that the
"absence of a
specifc exclusion for employment among the list of
exceptions
tends
to
support the Court of Appeal's
conclusion that Title IX does protect employees." Ante,
at
(citation omitteq).
I am unable to follow this
reasoning.
The absence of employment-related exceptions
may not be conclusive proof thab employment is not within
/
the scope of the statu~e
since Congress may have intended -z?
to cover all employmen .
But I fail to see how that .
absence affirmatively · icates that the statute was .mean y ~-t.e...d.·
d.a
to apply to employees.
Indeed, if Congress did intend to
~
f~
cover employees, it is anomalous that it did~not provide
exceptions similar to those in Title VI I fllpr example,
~ Title VII does not proscribe bona fide seniority plans, 42
u.s.c. §2000e-2(h), or preferential employment of Indians
at establishments operating on reservations, 42 u.s.c.
§2000e-2 (i).

, n

5.

modified

by

meaning."
the

later

600 F.

statute

treatment"

language
2d,

"reaches

that

beneficiaries. 5

which

at 584.
only

involve

clearly

limits

their

The court concluded that
those

types

discrimination

of

disparate

against

program

Ibid.

II
A

The court acknowledges, as it must, that §901 of

5 The question has also been presented to the
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits.
In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CAB), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
972 (1972)
the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Isleslboro.
And in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993 (CA9
1980), cert granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v.
Seattle Univ., 449 u.s. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier
circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had
held that the plain language of Title IX did not support
HEW's position.
Even /\ the decision below, in which the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
regulations, the court did not base its decision on the
statutory language, but stated that the "language is more
ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777.
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School
System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 (CAS 1980), cert pending
sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty School System, No. 80-1023.
There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund
termination to the offending program or activity.
In
reaching this decision, the court noted that programspecific
regulations
might
be
sustainable
in
some
instances, e.g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay
against female teachers paid with federal funds relative
~ to the amounts paid male teachers with federal funds. ~
l!r noted 'b"y theft co-tir~ .,_, an argument can be made that in such
a case, ~ the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of"
or "subject to discrimination under" the federal program.
But there is no indication it would agree with this Court
that the statutory language supports program-specific
regulations
prohibiting
all
kinds
of
discriminatory
employment practices with
respect
to all
types of
employees, i.e., secretaries and administrators as well as
teachers.

"

l
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Title IX as finally enacted was part of a Senate
bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess.

(1972), added - through

an amendment sponsored by Senator Bayh.

Loopholes in

earlier civil rights legislation had been identified in
hearings by a special House Committee in 1970.

-r

r?

. .
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With the purpose of closing these loopholes, the
Bayh floor amendment (Amendment No. 874) was introduced in
1972.

See 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)

amendment) .

(print of
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NORTH6 SALLY-POW
Title IX as finally enacted was part of ; (nate
bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess.

-

~

a/A
n ~ent

(1972), added (. through

sponsored by Senator Bayh.

.

r

Loopholes in

earlier civil rights legislation had been identified in
hearings by a special House Committee in 1970.

6.

Title
But

IX

it

that

"does

finds

a

§901 does

Ante,

not expressly

at

include

strong negative
not

"exclude

.

employees."

inference from the fact

employees

from

its

scope".

The Court then turns to the "legislative

history for evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant
to prohibit employment di scr iminat ion".
with

the

several Courts

of Appeals

Ibid.

I

agree

that have concluded

unequivocally that the statutory language cannot fairly be
read to proscribe employee discrimination. Only rarely may
legislative history be relied upon to read into a statute
language that Congress itself did not include.

To justify

such a reading of a statute, the legislative history must
show clearly and unequivocally that Congress did
what

it

failed

to

state. 6

The

Court's

intend

elaborate

exposition of the history of Title IX falls far short of
this standard.

~-·

- - - · · -.......
·- - - · ............. -

N b -...

···~~---.,.------

Title IX was enacted to close three loopholes in
earlier
\

civil

rights

legislation;

each

~crimination in educational institutions.r

the

Civil

Rights

Act of

employment

discrimination

religion,

or

national

1964,
on

involved /

Title VII of

though generally barring
the

origin,

basis
did

of
not

sex,

race,

apply

to

discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals
to perform work connected with the educational activities
of [educational] institutions."
VII,

§702,

78 Stat. 255.

banned discrimination

Pub. L. No. 88-352, title

And the Equal Pay Act of 1963

in wages on the basis of

sex,

29

6 see, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v.
Volpe, 410 u.s. 402, 412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this
ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is clear that we
must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the
legislative intent.").
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The Bayh floor amendment (Amendment No. 874)
was introduced in 1972/

~e

118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)

(print of amendment) I for the purpose of closing these
loopholes.

,•

7.

u.s.c.

§206{d) {1), but it did not apply to administrative,

executive,
See

Finally,

11

race,

professional

u.ss.c.

29

u.s.c.

or

§213{a)

Title

VI of

§2000d,
color,

barred
or

workers,

{1970)

the Civil

including

{no

longer

Rights

Act

discrimination

on

teachers.
in

force).

of
the

1964,

42

basis

of

national origin, .. but not sex,

in any

federally funded programs and activities.
1972,

In
amendment,

Senator

Amendment

874

Bayh
{the

Congress subsequently enacted,

introduced

Bayh

a

fl;or -.}

amendment),

which

~

to close these loopholes.

See 118 Cong . .Rec. 5803 {1972) {print of amendment] )!'.
In
·~ .... "'§§ 1001-1003 of the Amendent, a new Title IX was created,
banning discrimination on the basis of sex in federally
funded

educational

effectively

programs

extending

Title

and
VI's

prohibition

discriminati~. ~~ that

"

thus

activities,
to

amendment

~~

sex

amended

Title VII to cover employmentA in educational institutions.
Ibid.

And §§ 1001-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that

discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even
for teachers and other professionals.

Ibid.

Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act explicitly covered discrimination in employment in
educational institutions, there was no need to include §§
1001-1003

of

the

discrimination.
as

1't s

1 anguage

Bayh

Amendment

to

proscribe

such

Instead, Title I~ presumablyJ\enacted,

~~1t~b
s
to
ar11

d'1 scr
~~t'
. t
1m1na 10n aga1ns

beneficiaries of federally funded programs and activities.

~This in~erpretation~itle
1\

f~.f;;t,

modelled

Rights Act of 1964. 7

IX • eeei ¥es
after

Title VI

Title

~y

i~<6~~

VI of

the

Civil

was limited in its

Footnote{s) 7 will appear on following pages.

8.

scope to discrimination against beneficiaries of federally
funded programs, not general employment practices of fund
recipients.

u.s.c.

42

§2000d-3.

And, as this Court noted

in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 770-711
(1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new
provision

to be

interpreted consistently with Title VI,

which had been its model.
B

The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to
the

First,
in

inte ~etation

proper

~
1\

1972,

not

of

notes that "[i] t

in

interpreting Title

1964,
IX."

that

begs

the

question,

u.s.

IX

for

two

is Congress'

is

Ante,

University of Chicago, 441
point

Title

of

at

reasons.
intention

significance

(citing Cannon v.

677, 710-711 (1979).

however,

in

since

there

This
is

no

evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title IX, Congress
thought

Title

The seH:d

VI

applied

to

4

employment

discrimination.

~· Yt, ' unlike Title IX, includes a section, i.e. §604,
42

u.s.c.

§2000d-3, exressly stating that Title VI applies

only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to
employment

discrimination

per

se.

But

in

an

earlier

version of the legislation that was to become Title IX,
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI,
simply adding

the word

"sex."

In the end,

it is true,

Title IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI,
but

the

.

~
~ ~ 1-vr d_,_··~+<..~~
reason A t~t-. dis£.-Q~arest\Ti tle VI is that

reason

substantive.

for

this

Supporters

approach
feared

that

was
if

strategic,
Title

VI

not
were

7 The opertive language in the two provisions is
virtually identical.
Compare 42 u.s.c. §2000d (Title VI)
with 20 u.s.c. §168la . (Title IX).

9.

opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on
the

floor

of

the

Congress.

Sex

Discrimination

Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Education and Labor,

House of Representatives--Review of

regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
p. 409 (1975).
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and
IX, the Court

stresses ~

that the House version of the

Senate's Bayh Amendment originally contained a provision,
§1004, equivalent to §604 of Title VI, explicitly stating
that

no

section

discrimination

of

in

the

1972

employment,

eliminated by the Conference.

legislation
but

this

Ante,

applied

to

provision

at

was

A strong

argument ~ be made that there was a nonsubstantive
bill.

reason for

eliminating §1004 from

the House

In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on

Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara,
Chairman

of

background
change

was

that

of

Subcommittee,

Title

made

at

IX

to

a

while

witness,

conference

simply

explaining
noted
to

that

the
this

eliminate,

as

quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error.
Sex

Discrimination

Subcomm.

Regulations:

Hearings

Before

on Postsecondary Education and Labor,

the

House of

Representatives--Review of regulations to implement Title
IX,

94th Cong.,

1st Sess.

p.

409

(1975).

Even without

reference to Senator O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is
clear

that,

at

the time of

the Conference on the House

bill and the Senate's Bayh Amendment, §100 4 of the House
bill was a drafting mistake; it stated that no section of
the House bill applied to employment, though sections of
the

House

express

Bill,
changes

as
to

well
the

as

the

Senate

employment

version,

made

diescrimination

provisions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.

Since the

analogous provision of Title VI, §604, had been regarded
~
as a mere clarification, 8 the majo r iky is on weak ground
in

arguing

that

the

words

ritualistic

Conference

Report's
receded"

House

"the

use

of

the

reveals

a

substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an
obvious

drafting

error

at

a

very

late

stage

in

the

legislative process.

c
In

concluding

that

indicates Title

IX was

discrimination,

the Court

three

statements

statement,

ante
is

(1972))'

the

legislative

history

intended to extend to employment

of

a

is

forced

single

at

rely ~
A

The

senator.

(quoting

118

Senator

ambiguous.

to

Bayh

first

Cong.

Rec.

5803

did

state

that

faculty employment would be covered by his amendment after
mentioning the sections enacting Title IX but prior to any
mention of those amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
Immediately
IX' s

~~Title

thereafter,

however,

redress
quotes

has

never

discrimination

provided
in

Bayh's statements

1001-1005"

as

stated

paralle~those

enforcement powers

VI

he

"[c]entral

; or

that

in Title

fund

(i)

to

[his]

he

VI~~

terminatio~

employment. ~Next,
that

Title

regarded

amendment"

the

Court

"sections
and

(ii)

"[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in
all areas,"
118

Con g .

including employment.
Re c •

58 0 7

( 19 7 2) ) •

(quoting

Ante at

But,

§100 5

of

the

Bayh

8 see, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement
of Attorney General Kennedy)~ Civil Rights: Hearings on
H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. p. 198 (1964)
(statement of Congressman Celler,
House Floor Manager of Title VI).

11.

amendment

is

the

section

amending

Title

VII

and

thus

§§1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of
whether

Title

IX

does. 9

Moreover,

the

Court

uses

an

elipsis rather than include the following words from the
second Bayh statement:
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of
federally assisted programs and activities is
already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition
does not apply to discrimination on the basis of
sex.
In order to close this loophole, my
amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement
provisions
which
generally
parallel
the
provisions of title VI."
118 Cong. Rec. 5807
(1972) (in elipses ante at __).
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that
he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title
VI rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI.
In the third Bayh statement, ante at
118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator

(quoting

~

~responding
.;t

to

a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the
Court assumes that each sentence in that response refers
to Title IX.

But, as the Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit noted in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy •.• , as
well as the discussion immediately preceding and
following the above-quoted passage, indicates
that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into
three sections, two of which were specifically
aimed at students (admissions and services) , the
third at employees (employment) . While Senator
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed
to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell' s
quetion, we think HEW's reading is strained. We
think this particularly in light of the fact
that the discussion was an oral one and thus not
as prescise as a response in written form,
"
593 F. 2d, at 427.
Rather than support the Court's view, it is fair

9 see description of various sections of the
Amendment, supra at
See also 118 Cong. Rec.
(1972) (print of amendment) •

Bayh
5803

..
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In sum, the Court's decision today is predicated
on four assumptions that I am unwilling to impute to
Congress:

(i) Congress neglectfuly or forgetfully failed

to include familiar language in §901, that would have made
clear its intent;

(ii) Congress enacted a third statute

proscribing sex discrimination in employment in
educational institutions in the absence of any showing of
a need for the third; and (iii) that it failed to include
in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial
provisions relevant to employment discrimination; and (iv)
finally, that it vested the authority to enforce the third
statute in the Department of Education, a department
which, even the Soliciter General concedes, lacks the

2

0

..
experience and the qualifications to oversee and enforce
employment legislation.

<

'

•.,

..
>

'

.
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Specifically, the cutoff of funds would be at the
expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program,
without remeding injustice to the employee.

~itle

IX

contains no provision for back pay or restoration of
seniority rights.

Indeed, it even fails to mandate

employment or promotion to rectify discrimination.

Title

IX, by comparison with the other employment discrimination
statutes, is deficient also in other respects:

there are

no time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and
no guidance as to procedure.

The Solicitor General

conceded at oral argument that appropriate relief for the
two employees who initiated this suit was availale under
Title VII. 13

See transcript of oral argument, 27.

)
..
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The Court acknowledges, in view of the ambiguity
of §901, that we must look to the "legislative history for
evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant to prohibit
employment discrimination".

Ante, at

In addition

to what is normally embraced by the term "legislative
history" the Court ignores other factors highly relevant
to intent:

they include whether the ambiguity easily

could have been avoided by the legislative draftsman:
whether Congress has prior experience in legislative with
respect to the identical purpose now attributed to it: and
whether other legislation clearly and specifically already
addressed this purpose.

If these factors are considered,

2.

it is not an overstatement to say that it makes little
sense to read employment discrimination into §901.
If there had been an intent to include sex
discrimination in employment, no legislative draftsman even a draftsman of modest accomplishments - would not
have written it as above set forth.

Moreover, the

draftsman would have been guided by the employment
discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
that specifically deal with this problem.
Indeed, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were the
statutes previously enacted by Congress to deal expressly
with employment discrimination, and at the same time new
Title IX was being drafted and considered, Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act were being amended to proscribe
specifically employment discrimination in educational

3.

. .

.

.
institutions on the basis of sex.

It is not easy to

believe that Congress intended to enact a third statute
addressing this identical problem, and that it chose
language ambiguous at best and in important respects
inconsistent with the other two statutes.
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The Court acknowledges, in view of the ambiguity of this
language, that we must look to the "legislative history
for evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant to
prohibit employment discrimination".

Ante, at

Although the Court examined at length the truncated
legislative history, it ignored other factors highly
relevant to intent:

they include whether the ambiguity

easily could have been avoided by the legislative
draftsman; whether Congress had prior experience in
legislating with respect to the identical subject; and
whether existing legislation clearly and adequately
proscribed the conduct in question.

When these factors

are considered, it is not an overstatement to say that it

2.

;

makes little sense to read sex employment discrimination
language into §901.
If there had been such an intent, no legislative
draftsman - even one of modest accomplishments - would
have written §901 as above set forth.

Moreover, the

draftsman would have been guided easily by the employment
discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
that specifically addresses this problem.
statutes had been

These two

enacted previously by Congress to deal

expressly with employment discrimination.

At the same

time Title IX was being drafted and considered, Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act were being amended to proscribe
specifically employment discrimination in educational
institutions on the basis of sex.

Congress hardly could

3•

.

;

have intended to enact a third statute addressing this
identical problem, choosing language ambiguous at best.

..
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- - - - - - - -,

the cutoff of funds would be at

the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the federally
funded program.

Title IX contains no provision for back

pay or restoration of seniority rights.

Indeed, it even

contains no provision requiring employment or promotion to
rectify discrimination.

Title IX, by comparison with the

other employment discrimination statutes, is deficient
also in other respects:

there are no time limits for

action, no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to
procedure.

The Solicitor General conceded at oral

argument that appropriate relief for the two employees who
initiated this suit was availale under Title VII. 13

See

transcript of oral argument, 27.

.··

).:..
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As indicated above, where the critical words -

in this

ca~ "employment discrimination~ absent

from

the statutory language and its meaning is otherwise clear,
reliance on the legislative history to add the omitted
words is rarely appropriate.

Only if the legislative

history is clear and unequivocal as to congressional
intent, should a court supply what Congress failed to
include.

W,R.atQvi! r

e ~~ --may -Be

sa te a l:!#&t

history today relied upon by the
and unequivocal.

I

...
'

lh~

Cour ~~

legislative

is not clear
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The Court acknowledges, in view of the ambiguity of this
language, that we must look to the "legislative history
for evidence as to whether or not §901 was meant to
prohibit employment discrimination".

Ante, at

----

Although the Court examined at length the truncated
legislative history, it ignored other factors highly
relevant to intent:

they include whether the ambiguity

easily could have been avoided by the legislative
draftsman~

whether Congress had prior experience in

legislating with respect to the identical subject; and
whether existing legislation clearly and adequately
proscribed the conduct in question.

When these factors

are considered, it is not an overstatement to say that it

2.

~ -L, ~
~~~k.~ 0c~A

,t-..:,

makes little' sense to

d

;taft~e:~e

~

sex employment discrimination

LM.I

inE<>A §901.

If there had been such an intent, no legislative
draftsman - even one of modest accomplishments - would
have written §901 as above set forth.

Moreover, the

draftsman would have been guided easily by the employment
discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
that specifically addresses this problem.
statutes had been

These two

enacted previously by Congress to deal

expressly with employment discrimination.

At the same

time Title IX was being drafted and considered, Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act were being amended to proscribe
specifically employment discrimination in educational
institutions on the basis of sex.

Congress hardly could

3.

have intended to enact a third statute addressing this
identical problem, choosing language ambiguous at best.

12.

to

say

that

natural

reading

discrimination
' funded

the

legislative
of

the

only

programs

statute.

against

and

history

accords

with

the

Title

IX

prohibits

beneficiaries

of

federally

activities,

not

all

employment

discrimination by recipients of federal funds.
Title IX
~
is modelled after Title VI, wfl±eh is explicitly so
limited--and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can
be read to the contrary, they are ambiguous.

III

As the sole

issue before us

is the meaning of

§90l(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:
"No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance
" §901 (a).

(j)

The Court concludes

that this

language must be

read to

proscribe sex discrimination in employment by educational
institutions that receive financial assistance under Title
IX.

the dr aftsm~n of Title

If

IX,

and particularly of

§901--presumably one or more lawyers--had been instructed
to include sex discrimination in employment, it cannot be
argued seriously that the section would have been written
as set
read

forth

the

above.

foregoing

I

submit that no lawyer,

language

alone,

would

think

asked to
it

had

f
as I

anything to do with the employment practices of schools.
An

employee

"participating
-z,{

v

of
in,

a

school
or

is

denied

not
the

thought
benefits

of
of"

an

"education program or activity receiving federal financial /
assistance ... 10

Moreover, regardless of the skills of the

Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages.

12.

to

say

that

natural

reading

discrimination
-funded

the

legislative
of

the

only

programs

statute.

against

and

history

accords

with

the

Title

IX

prohibits

beneficiaries

of

federally

activities,

not

all

employment

discrimination by recipients of federal funds.
Title IX
~
is modelled after Title VI, wflteb is explicitly so
limited--and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can
be read to the contrary, they are ambiguous.

(5)---_._?i. L____l-

III

:me before us is the meaning of
?eat the relevant language:
United States shall, on the
luded from participation in,
its of, or be subjected to
· any education program or
~deral financial assistance
this language must be read to
ion in employment by educational
financial assistance under Title
E Title IX, and particularly of
1ore lawyers--had been instructed
.tion in employment, it cannot be
~

section would have been written

submit that no lawyer, asked to
\ read

the

foregoing

language

alone,

would

think

it had

anything to do with the employment practices of schools.
An

employee

"participating
-z,{

v

of
in,

a

school
or

is

denied

not
the

thought
benefits

of

as

of"

an

"education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. nlO

Moreover, regardless of the skills of the

Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages.

13.

draftsmen, the undisputed meaning of essentially identical

I

{ anti-discrimination language in Title VI should guide our
interpretation of Title IX.
Chicago,

u.s.

441

677,

See Cannon v. University of

710-711

(1979).

But

to reach a

result it deems desirable, the Court puts common sense and
precedent aside and undertakes an elaborate examination of
an ambiguous legislative history to conclude that Congress

/

has meant something it has not said.

,.
'\

Title IX, there is no substantial legislative history that
supports

the

Court's

. t erpre t a t.1on. 11
1n

The

most

dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports
of

the

responsible committees.

result of a

floor

Because Title

IX is the

amendment, there is no explanation of

its meaning in reports from the relevant House and Senate
Committees. 12

In light of

this

legislative record,

the

~~~~
10 some employees might be beneficiarie of federallyfunded
programs--e.g.,
grant
programs
for
faculty
research--but the Court's holding today
not limited to
discrimination against such employees.
T e respondents
who initiated these cases are two women se ing full time
reemployment, and neither claims to be a par icipant in or
to receive the benefits of a federal funded rogram except
tangentially in that federal funds aid recipients in
meeting general operating expenses. ~

11The Court devotes considerable time to describing postenactment actions or inaction on the part of subsequent
Congresses.
See ante, at
The fact that, in
1975,
Congress
considered-,- but
failed
to
enact,
resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially
irrelevant in determining the intent of the enacting
Congress in 1972.
Similarly, the fact that a subsequent
Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting
Title
IX's
coverage
with
respect
to
employment
discrimination does not indicate that the 1972 Congress
meant to include employment discrimination within Title
IX.
12 It is true that the Conference Report noted that
"the House receded" with regard to the deletion of that
section of the House bill stating that no section of the
1972 legislation applied to employment discrimination. S.
Footnote continued on next page.

14.

Court is forced to rely almost exclusively on fragmentary
statements by one supporter of the statute.
have

emphasized

legislator,

that

even

the

"[t]he
sponsor,

remarks
are

we previously
of

not

a

controlling

analyzing legislative history," Chrysler Corp.
441 U.S.

----

single

v.

in

Brown,

281, 311 {1979), but the Court ignores this rule

-

-

~ ~he-court also disregards

what a

I

reasonable
was

no

legislative

need

to

body would have

enact

employment discriminatiq__n

amended

third

statute

in educational

-There

proscribing

(""' (

institutions on

Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were

~x.

being

a

intended.

to

accomplish

precisely

that

result.

e, -

---

Moreover, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and
Title

IX

suggests

that

Congresp would not have enacted
~L~-n~~ ..L ~~-~'..L.d.
~se inconsistent provision~ ~ n~~e t~= sam~gbi.em. -r~

wi4_.

'cJA._
~

,,

l

Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute
with carefully prescribed procedures for conciliation by
the EEOC, federal court remedies available within certain
time

limits,

and

certain

specified

forms

of

relief,

available unless the discriminatory conduct falls within
one of several exceptions. See 42 u.s.c.

§2000e et seq.

This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast
to Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund
ter ination,

B

an A employee

A

a p = t l y available at _the request of
who

~iscriminat~ ag ~nat

employment in a federally funded program or activity.

in

a~

Conf. Rep. No. 92-789, p. 221 {1972); H.R.Conf. Rep. 921085, p. 221 {1972)
{quoted ante, at
)•
But, as
discussed earlier in text, this evidence rs-as ambiguous
as Senator Bayh's remarks. See supra at ______

-""""'

lfp/ss 04/15/82

Rider A, p. 15 (North Haven)

NORTH15 SALLY-POW
~~---------~ Specifically, the cutoff of funds would be at the

expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program,
without remeding injustice to the employee.

Title IX

contains no provision for back pay or restoration of
seniority rights.

Indeed, it even fails to mandate

employment or promotion to rectify discrimination.

Title

IX, by comparison with the other employment discrimination

~

statutes, is deficient also in other respects:
~

there are

no time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and
no guidance as to procedure.

The Solicitor General

conceded at oral argument that appropriate relief for the
two employees who initiated this suit was availale under
Title VII. 13

See transcript of oral argument, 27.

-

-

_. ___

joj

''i(•WM

~

•

.!'awa rded" only at the expense of innocent
the

federally

--I ~
ddi tion,

funded program.

IX, there are no time limits, no

under Title

onciliation provisions,

- ~ ~~-

._

and no remedies available that will
/\
wrong suffered by an aggrieved

ctually redress the

Soliciter General conceded at oral
is av ilable

under Title VIr. 13

See

Finally, Congress delegated the administration of
Title

IX

to

the

Welfare .'9:-P-

Title

administered

by

~

most

Department
VII

the

unlikely

of

and

Health,

the

Department

of

Equal
Labor

that Congress would

Education

and

Pay

are

and

Act
EEOC.

It

intend not only

duplicate substantive legislation but also enforcement of

s~~ferent
1\

departments

of

government

with different enforcement powers, areas of expertise, and
enforcement
Community

methods.

Schools

v.

\1~

v The
HEW,

1977), aff'd 600 F.2d 581

District
438

(CA6)

F.

Court

Supp.

1021

cert. den., 444

in

Romeo

(ED Mich.

u.s.

972

13 An employee could presumably bring act ions against
the school district under Title VII, Title IX, and the
Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her wrong in the
form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition,
request that funds be terminated.
14

'±'-fl~ ~ _t he Court's decision will result in needless
duplication ~ f governmental bureaucracy.
Although HEW
would
prefer
to have no
involvement
in employment
discrimination, see Brief of Soliciter General 37, n. 26,
it will be required to maintain a staff of employees to
enforce the anti-discrimination in employment portion of
Title IX.
And these employees will duplicate the large
staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already
devoted to employment discrimination.
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there
will now be tw6 sets of federal regulations and regulators
overseeing their employment practices.
These different
governmental departments may, or may not, have the same
substantive standards and filing requirements at any given
time.

/

v'

lfp/ss 04/15/82

Rider A, p. 16 (North Haven)
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) fu.~""1 ~ 'Z""Jw.4'J~-t.....f.tJ-,

In sum, the Court's

decisio ~

is predicated

on four assumptions that I am unwilling to impute to

~

(i) ~Congress

Congress:

neglectf~ly

or forgetfully

fai ~

wiZ/._~~ e4c.~.,~
to include

f a m Hi~r

clear its intent:

language in §90l.A that would have made

(ii) Congress enacted a third
....... statute

proscribing sex discrimination in employment in
educational institutions in the absence of any showing of
a need

-~dc·~~~lW-0 ~)

for~ ~-e ~~.0 : ~

(iii) that it failed to include

in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial
provisions relevant to employment discrimination: and (iv)
finally, that it vested the authority to enforce the third
statute in the Department of Education, a department
whic~

even the Soliciter General

concede~ lacks

the

2.

experience and the qualifications to oversee and enforce
employment legislation.

,

..

.,

•
.,

16.

(1979), correctly observed:
"These governmental agencies, particularly the
EEOC, were established specifically for the
purpose
of
regulating
discrimination
in
employment practices.
These agencies have the
expertise and their enabling legislation has
provided
them with
the
investigative
and
enforcement
machinery
necessary
to
compel
compliance
with
regulations
against
sex
discrimination in employment. HEW does not have
similar enforcement authority."
438 F. Supp.,
at 1034.
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the
federal respondents

in this case, acknowledges what the

Romeo Court thought was self evident:
"The Department of Education has only 1 imi ted
expertise in employment matters.
Its view is
that employment cases are better resolved under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
provides more appropriate remedies for such
- -...... ses." Brief, p. 37.
~~~ c~t's

decision today is predicate

_ bs.ue eee.g. able-t-o crtta"tfl~ (ii) Congress
~
a ~ statutef proscribing sex discrimination in

~-t---wW<EWld

A

(,

employment in educational institutions in the absence of
a need for the third; and

LV
(H:-i.)

finally,

that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute
in the Department of Education, a department which, even
' the Solici ter General concedes, lacks the experience and
qualifications

to

oversee

and

enforce

.4o

~~

employment

egislation.
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~

~--re~~~
~~~--h!:>

ftECEIVED

SUPREME COURT. U.S.
PU _LJCFJ'n;~s U~" .

·a?
'·

DRAFT:

f4Pf1,, 1'I

NO. 80-986, North Haven Board of Education v.
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?f

Trumbull Board of Education

v.

u. s.

Dept. of Education & Potz

POWELL, J., dissenting.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20

u.s.c.
basis

§1681
of

receiving
Health,

1 As

et

sex

seq.,
in

federal
Education,

prohibits

education
funds.
and

In

discrimination

programs
1975,

Welfare

and

the
(HEW) 1

on

the

activities

Department

of

promulgated

n~',

noted by the majority, ante at
,
HEW's
duties under Title IX were transfered to tne-Depa~\ment of
Education in 1979 by §301 (a) (3) of the Department of
Footnote continued on next page.

~

2

regulations
gender

in

prohibiting
employment

§106.5l(a) (1).

discrimination
by

fund

on

recipients.

the

basis
34

0

of

C.F.R.

Today, the Court upholds the validity of

these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its
legislative
Because

I

history,

and

several

believe the Court's

consistent with the

post-enactment

events.

interpretation is neither

statutory language nor

supported by

its legislative history, I dissent. 2

I

Although the majority begins with the language of
the

statute,

entirety only
In

the

it

quotes

the

relevant

language

in

its

in the opening paragraphs of the opinion.

section

considering

the

statute's

meaning,

the

Court quotes two words of the statute and paraphrases the

Education Organization Act,
20 u.s.c. §344~(3) (1976
majority in re r· g to both
the relevant ac s in this
reor~anization. See anteAat

Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat.
678,
ed., Supp. IV).
I follow the
agencies as HEW since many of
case took place before the
__, n.\:
j

The
Court
acknowledges
events
it
discusses
only
interpretation of the statute.

that
the
post-enactment
lend
credence 11
to
its
Ante, at

11

~

3.

rest,
odds

thereby
with

suggesting

the

an

language

according to the Court,

interpretation

used

in

the

actually

statute.

at

Thus,

"[s]ection 90l's broad directive

that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the basis
of gender appears, on its face,
well as students."

Ante,

to

include employees as
This is not what the

at

statutory language provides.
In relevant part, the statute states:
"No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance
" Education Amendments of 1972, §90l(a), 20
u.s.c. §1681 (a).

A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in,
or the beneficiaries of, programs or activities receiving
federal

funding.

Congress

to

It

tortures

conclude

that

the
not

language
only

chosen

teachers

by
and

administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are
discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment,
are

thereby

activity 3 :

(i)
(ii)

denied

participation

in

a

program

or

denied

the

of

a

program

or

benefits

Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages.

4.

activity:

or

(iii)

subject

to

education program or activity.

discrimination

under

an

Moreover, Congress made no

reference whatever to employers or employees in Title IX,
in

sharp

contrast

to

quite

explict

language

in

other

statutes regulating employment practices. 4
It is noteworthy that not one of the six Courts
of Appeals to consider the question before us has reached
the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by
the statutory language.

The issue was presented initially

to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro
School Committee v.
cert denied,

Califano,

444 u.s.

972

593 F.

(1979),

2d 424,

426

(CAl),

and that decision has

been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider
the

question.

There,

the

court

concluded

that

"[t]he

language of section 901, 20 u.s.c. §1681, on its face, is
aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal monies,

i.e. ,

3I
agree with
the majority that employees who
directly participate in a federal program, i.e., teachers
who receive federal grants, are, of course, protected by
Title IX. See ante:, at __.
4 see, e.g., 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-"): 29 u.s.c. §206 (d) (1) (Equal Pay Act: "[n]o employer
having employees •... ").

5.

either

students attending

institutions receiving

federal

funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded
by the United States government."

The court went on to

point out that this reading of "the plain language of the
statute

is buttressed by an examination of the specific

exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate
to students, not employees. 5

Ibid.

In the next appellate decision,

Romeo Community

Schools v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert denied, 444 U.S.
972

(1979),

the Court of Appeals

for

the

Sixth Circuit

rejected the interpretation of the statute now relied on
by

this

Court,

noting

that

"as

statute is not nearly so broad.
modified

by

later

language

actually

written,

the

The words 'no person' are

which

clearly

limits

their

5 The
Court
today
not
only
finds
this
point
un~c·ncing,
but concludes that the
"absence of a
sp cif
exclusion for employment among the list of
ex
ions
tends
to
support the Court of Appeal's
conclusion that Title IX does protect employees." Ante,
at
(citation omitted).
I am unable to follow this
reasoning.
The absence of employment-related except ions
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within
the scope of the statute.
But I fail to see how that
absence affirmatively indicates that the statute was
intended to apply to employees.
Indeed, if Congress did
intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not
provide exceptions similar to those in Title VII.
For
example, Title VII does not proscribe bona fide seniority
plans, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-2(h), or preferential employment
of Indians at establishments operating on reservations, 42
u.s.c. §2000e-2(i).

6.

meaning."
the

600 F.

statute

treatment"

2d, at 584.

"reaches

that

beneficiaries. 6

only

involve

The court concluded that
those

types

discrimination

of

disparate

against

program

Ibid.

II

6 The question has also been presented to the
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits.
In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 u.s.
972 (1972)
the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
cons ide red HEW's arguments but "adopted" the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Isleslboro.
And in Seattle University A_v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993 (CA9
1980), cert granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v.
Seattle Univ., 449 u.s. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier
circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had
held that the plain language of Title IX did not support
HEW's position.
Even in the decision below, in which the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
regulations, the court did not base its decision on the
statutory language, but stated that the "language is more
ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777.
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School
System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735 (CAS 1980), cert. pending
sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty School System, No. 80-1023.
There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund
termination to the offending program or activity.
In
reaching this decision, the court noted that programspecific
regulations
might
be
sustainable
in
some
instances, e.g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay
against female teachers paid with federal funds relative
to the amounts paid male teachers with federal funds. The
court noted that an argument can be made that in such a
case, the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or
"subject to discrimination under" the federal program.
622 F.2d, at 737-738. But there is no indication it would
agree with this Court that the statutory language supports
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of
discriminatory employment practices with respect to all
types of employees, i.e., secretaries and administrators
as well as teachers.

7.

A

The Court acknowledges, as it must, that §901 of
Title

IX

"does not expressly

include

• employees."

But it finds a strong negative inference in the fact that
§901 does not "exclude employees from its scope".
at
for

The Court then turns to the "legislative history
evidence

as

to

whether

or

not

prohibit employment discrimination".
the

Ante,

several

Courts

of

Appeals

§901

was

Ibid.
that

meant

to

I agree with

have

concluded

unequivocally that the statutory language cannot fairly be

read to proscribe employee discrimination.AOnly rarely may
legislative history be relied upon to read into a statute
language that Congress itself did not include.

To justify

such a reading of a statute, the legislative history must
show clearly and unequivocally that Congress did
what

it

failed

to

state. 7

The

Court's

intend

elaborate

exposition of the history of Title IX falls far short of

7 See,

e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v.
Volpe, 410 u.s. 402, 412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this
ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is clear that we
must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the
legislative intent.").

8.

this standard.
Title

IX

was

a

floor

amendment

sponsored

by

Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972).
rights

The amendment closed loopholes in earlier civil

identified

in hearings

See

1970.

three

legislation;

problem

by a

Discrimination

special
Against

had

areas

been

House Committee
Women:

Hearings

in
on

Section 805 of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee
on

Education

Labor,

9lst

Civil

Rights

of

the

Cong.,
Act

House

Committee

2d

Sess.

(1970) •

of

1964,

though

employment

discrimination

religion,

or

national

on

the

on

Title

did

of

the

barring

sex,

not

and

of

VII

generally

basis

origin,

Education

race,

apply

to

discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals
to perform work connected with the educational activities
of [educational] institutions."
VII,

§702,

78 Stat. 255.

banned discrimination

u.s.c.

lY

See

29

And the Equal Pay Act of 1963

in wages on the basis of

sex,

29

§206(d) (1), but it did not apply to administrative,

executive,

~

Pub. L. No. 88-352, title

or

professional
§213(a)

workers,

(1970)

(no

including
longer

teachers.
in

force) .

9.

Finally,

u.s.c.

Title

VI of

§2000d,

"race,

color,

the

barred
or

Civil

Rights

discrimination

national origin,"

Act
on

of
the

1964,

42

basis

of

but not sex,

in any

federally funded programs and activities.
The

Bayh

floor

amendment,

Arnendmen t

No.

was introduced in 19 72, 118 Cong. Rec. 580 3 (19 72)
of amendment), to close these loopholes.
of

the

Arnendent,

discrimination on
educational

a

new

the

programs

Title

basis
and

of

IX

was

sex

in

activities,

8 7 4,
(print

In §§ 1001-1003
created,

banning

federally
thus

funded

effectively

extending Title VI's prohibition to sex discrimination in
federally funded programs.
amended

Section 1005 of that amendment

Title VII to cover

educational institutions.

employment discrimination in

Ibid.

And §§ 1001-1010 amended

the Equal Pay Act so that di scr iminat ion
basis

of

sex

professionals.

was

barred,

even

for

in pay on the

teachers

and

other

Ibid.

Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act explicitly covered discrimination in employment in
educational institutions, there was no need to include §§
1001-1003

of

the

Bayh

Amendment

to

proscribe

such

10.

discrimination.
as

Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted,

its language clearly indicates, to bar discrimination

against

beneficiaries

of

federally

funded

programs

and

activities.

This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed

by the

that

fact

it was modelled after Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8

Title VI was limited in its

scope to discrimination against beneficiaries of federally
funded programs, not general employment practices of fund
recipients.
noted

42

U• S •C •

in Cannon v.

§ 2 0 0 Od- 3 • 9

And,

University of Chicago,

as
441

this

u.s.

Court
677,

770-711 (1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it expected
the

new

provision

to

be

interpreted

consistently

with

Title VI, which had been its model.
B

8 The opertive language in the two provisions is
virtually identical. Compare 42 u.s.c. §2000d (Title VI)
with 20 U.S .C. §l68la (Title IX) .
9 42

u.s.c.

§2000d-3 states:

"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall
be construed to authorize action under this
subchapter by any department or agency with
respect to any department or agency or labor
organization except where a primary objective of
the Federal financial assistance is to provide
employment."

11.

The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to
the proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons.
First, it notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972,
not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title
IX."

Ante,

Chicago,

at

441 U.S.

(citing
677,

Cannon

710-711

v.

(1979).

University

of

This point begs

the question, however, since there is no evidence that in
1972, when it passed Title IX, Congress thought Title VI
applied to employment discrimination.
advanced by the Court for
it,

unlike

u.s.c.

Title

§2000d-3,

IX,

A The

second reason

disregarding Title VI is that

includes a

section,

i.e.

§604,

42

exressly stating that Title VI applies

only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to
employment

discrimination

per

se.

But

in

an

earlier

version of the legislation that was to become Title IX,
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI,
simply adding

the word

"sex."

In the end,

it is true,

Title IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI,
but

the

reason

substantive.

for

this

Supporters

approach
feared

that

was
if

strategic,
Title

VI

not
were

opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on

12.

the

floor

of

the

Congress.

Sex

Discrimination

Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Education and Labor, House of Representatives--Review of
regulations to implement Title IX,

94th Cong., 1st Sess.

p. 409 (1975).
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and
IX,

the

Court

stresses

that

the

House

version

of

the

Senate's Bayh Amendment originally contained a provision,
§1004, equivalent to §604 of Title VI, explicitly stating
that

no

section

discrimination

of

in

the

1972

legislation

employment,

but

eliminated by the Conference.
argument,

however,

substantive
bill.

can

reason for

be

this

Ante,

made

to

provision

at __•

that

applied

there

was ~1J.

A

A strong

was

a

non-

eliminating §1004 from the House

In 197 5 hearings before the House Subcommittee on

Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara,
Chairman

of

background
change

was

that

of

Title

made

at

Subcommittee,
IX

to

a

conference

while

witness,
simply

explaining
noted
to

that

eliminate,

the
this
as

quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error.
Sex

Discrimination

Regulations:

Hearings

Before

the

13.

S u b e on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of
Representatives--Review of regulations to implement Title
IX,

94th Cong.,

1st Sess.

p.

409

Even without

(1975).

reference to Senator O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is
clear

that,

at

the time of the Conference on the House

bill and the Senate's Bayh Amendment, §1004 of the House
mistake~

bill was a drafting

it stated that no section of

the House bill applied to employment, though sections of
the House Bill, as well as the Senate version, contained
express

changes

to

the

employment

diescrimination

provisions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.

Since the

analogous provision of Title VI, §604, had been regarded
as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is on weak ground in
arguing

that

ritualistic

the
words

Conference
"the

Report's

House

receded"

use

of

reveals

the
a

substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an
obvious

drafting

error

at

a

very

late

stage

in

the

legislative process.

10 see, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement
of Attorney General Kennedy)~ Civil Rights: Hearings on
H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. p. 198 (1964)
(statement of Congressman Celler,
House Floor Manager of Title VI).

14.

c
In

concluding

indicates Title

IX was

that

the

legislative

history

intended to extend to employment

discrimination, the Court is forced to rely primarily on
the

statements

,A statement,

~

'

of

a

(quoting

ante" at

(1972)), ~ is

senator • 11

single

ambiguous.

118

first

Cong.

Rec.

5803

did

state

that

Bayh

Senator

The

faculty employment would be covered by his amendment after
mentioning the sections enacting Title IX but prior to any

mention of those amending Title VII and the Equal Pay
Immediately

thereafter,

however,

he~

stated

that

Act.~~
Title

IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title VI.
Title

VI

has

never

provided

for

fund

Yet

termination

to

redress discrimination in employment.
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i)
he

regarded

amendment"

"sections 10 01-100 5" as
and

(ii)

"[t]his

" [ c] entr al to

portion

of

the

[his]

amendment

covers discrimination in all areas," including employment.

11 The most dependable sources of legislative intent
are the reports of the responsible committees.
Because
Title IX is the result of a floor amendment, there is no
explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant
House and Senate Committees.

15.

Ante~at

___ (quoting 118 Cong.

Rec.

5807

(1972)).

But,

§1005 of the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title
VII and thus §§1001-1005 cover employment discrimination
regardless
Court

of

whether

Title

uses an elipsis rather

IX

does. 12

Moreover,

than include the

the

following

words from the second Bayh statement:

?

?

"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of
federally assisted programs and activities is
already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition
does , not apply to discrimination on the basis of
sex.
In order to close this loophole, my
amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement
provisions
which
generally
parallel
the
provisions of title VI."
118 Cong. Rec. 5807

r--l--,----(-l-97_2_)_(_i_n,

1pse

ante~at

__) ·

f

Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that
he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title
VI rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI.
In the third Bayh statement, ante ~at ___ (quoting
118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to
a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the
Court assumes that each sentence in that response refers
to Title IX.

But, as the Court of Appeals for the First

12 see description of various sections of the
Amendment, supra"at ___•
See also 118 Cong. Rec.
(1972) (print of amendment).

Bayh
5803

~

16.

Circuit noted in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy~... ~ as
well as the discussion immediately precedin~ and
following the above-quoted passage, indicates
that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into
three sections, two of which were specifically
aimed at students (admissions and services) , the
third at employees (employment). While Senator
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed
to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell' s
quetion, we think HEW's reading is strained. We
think this particularly in light of the fact
that the discussion was an oral one and thus not
as prescise as a response in written form, ...• "
59 3 F. 2d, at 4 2 7.

Rather than support the Court's view, it is fair
to

say

natural

that

reading

discrimination
funded

the

legislative
of

the

only

programs

statute.

against

and

history

J(

accords

modelled

after

IX

prohibits

beneficiaries

of

federally

activities,

Title

the

Title

not

all

discrimination by recipients of federal funds.
is

with

VI,

which

is

employment
Title IX

explicitly

so

limited--and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can
be read to the contrary, they are ambiguous. 13

ft!

13
The Court devotes considerable time to describing
post-enactment actions or
inaction on the part of ~
subsequent Congresses.
See ante, at ~/
.
The fact ~
that, in 1975, Congress cons1dered, but flrred to enact,
resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially
irrelevant in determining the intent of the enacting
Congress in 1972.
Similarly, the fact that a subsequent
Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting
Title
IX's
coverage
with
respect
to
employment
discrimination does not indicate that the 1972 Congress
meant to include employment discrimination within Title
Footnote continued on next page.

17.

As indicated above, when critical words, in this
case

"employment

discrimination,"

are

absent

from

a

statute and its meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on
legislative

history

appropriate.

to

add

omitted

words

is

rarely

Only when legislative history gives clear

and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should
a court presume to add what Congress failed to include.
And,

however

history relied

else

one

might

describe

upon by the Court

the

today,

legislative

it is neither

(

clear nor unequivocal.

III

As the sole issue before us is the meaning of
§90l(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:
"No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance
" §901 (a).

The

IX.

Court

acknowledges

that,

in

view

of

the

lack

of

18.

support for its position in this language, it must look to
the "legislative history for evidence as to whether or not
§901 was

meant

Ante, at

to

prohibit

employment

discrimination".

Although the Court examines at length the

truncated legislative history,
highly

relevant

easily

could

draftsman;

to

intent:

have

been

it

ignores other

(i}

whether

avoided

by

the

the

factors

ambiguity
legislative

( i i} whether Congress had prior experience and

a certain amount of expertise in legislating with respect
to

this particular

subject;

and

(iii}

whether existing

legislation clearly and adequately proscribed and remedied
the

conduct

considered,

in
there

question.
is

no

When

reason

these

to read

factors

are

sex employment

discrimination language into §901.
If there had been such an intent, no legislative
draftsman--even one of modest accomplishments--would have
written §901 as above set forth.

The draftsman would have

been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination
language

in Title VI I

and

the

Equal Pay Act,

specifically addressing this problem.
these

other

statutes

had

language

Moreover, although

been J\enacted

by

an

earlier

19.

Congress,

at

considered,

the
Title

time

Title

VII

and

IX

the

was

being

Equal

drafted

Pay Act

were

and
also

amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination
in

educational

Congress

would

addressing

this

institutions
hardly

the

enacted

have

problem,

on

but,

basis

a

of

third

in contrast

to

sex.

statute

the other

two, use language ambiguous at best.
In addition,

a comparison of

the provisions of

Title VII and Title IX suggests that Congress would not
have enacted the inconsistent provisions of of the latter
with respect to remedies and procedures.

Title VII is a

comprehensive anti-discrimination statute with carefully
prescribed
federal

procedures

court

for

remedies

conciliation

available

by

within

the

certain

EEOC,
time

limits, and certain specified forms of relief, designed to
make

whole

the

victims

of

illegal

discrimination

and

available unless discriminatory conduct falls within one
of several

exceptions.~ee

42

u.s.c.

§2000e et seq.

This

thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to
Title

IX,

which

termination,

contains only one extreme

apparently now available at

remedy,

the

fund

request of

20.

any

female

employment
This

employee
in

cutoff

a

who

can

federally

of

funds,

prove

funded

at

the

discrimination

in

program

or

activity.

expense

of

innocent

beneficiaries of the funded program, will not remedy the
injustice

to

the

authorize

a

employee.

single

reemployment,

or

discrimination.

Indeed,

action,

promotion,

And Title

such
to

IX,

Title

IX

as

does

not

employment,

rectify

employment

unlike Title VII, has no

time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no
guidance as

to procedure. 14

seq.

(Title IX) with 42

The

Solicitor

appropriate

General

relief

for

Compare 20

u.s.c.

§2000e et seq.

conceded
the

two

at

oral

employees

this suit was availale under Title VII. 15

/

u.s.c.

§1681 et

(Title VII).

argument
who

that

initiated

See transcript

14 It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress
itself provided for administrative procedures to redress
employment discrimination in Title VII, see 42 U.S.C.
§2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in
Title IX, see 20 u.s.c. §1681 et seq. Such administrative
procedures as are available under Title IX are part of
theregulations promulgated by HEW, 45 C.F.R. §§80.7-80.10.
~Gl .the
administrative
procedures
enacted
by
~
~?~~ress. in~the U.S.C and by HEW in the C.F.R. are q~ ,
different, though addressing a single problem.
The~
regulations
provide
for
Administrative-Procedure-Act
hearings, followed by judicial review.
See 45 C.F.R. §§
80.9-80.11.
In Contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator
_...._......,
attempting to settle employment disputes, and then, as
counsel for the victims of d1scrimination in subsequent de
novo judicial proceedings. See 42 u.s.c. §2000e, et seq~
Footnote(s) 15 will appear on following pages.

it so
J.e.A .j re. s...~

21.

//

of

~ ral ~rgument, 27.

AFinally,

Congress delegated the

administration of Title IX to the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare.

Title VII and the Equal Pay Act

are administered by the Department of Labor and EEOC.
is

most

unlikely

that

Congress

would

intend

not

It
only
/

duplicate substantive legislation but also enforcement of
these provisions by different departments of government
with different enforcement powers, areas of expertise, and
enforcement

methods. 16

Community Schools v.

The

HEW,

District

438 F.

Supp.

Court
1021

in

Romeo

(ED Mich.

19 7 7) , a f f ' d 6 0 0 F • 2d 5 81 (CA 6 ) c e r t . den • , 4 4 4 U. S . 9 7 2
(1979), correctly observed:
"These governmental agencies,

particularly the

15 An employee could presumably bring actions against
the school district under Title VII, ' Title IX, and the
Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her wrong in the
form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition,
requ!gt that funds be terminated.
The Court's decision will result in needless
duplication of governmental bureaucracy.
Although HEW
would prefer to have no involvement in employment
discrimination, see Brief of Soliciter General 37, n. 26,
it will be required to maintain a staff of employees to
enforce the anti-discrimination in employment portion of
Title IX.
And these employees will duplicate the large
staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already
devoted to employment discrimination.
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there
will now be two sets of federal regulations and regulators
overseeing their employment practices.
These different
governmental departments may, or may not, have the same
substantive standards and filing requirements at any given
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in
the event of non-compliance are quite different.
See
discussion in text supra, at

22.

EEOC, were established specifically for the
purpose
of
regulating
discrimination
in
employment practices.
These agencies have the
expertise and their enabling legislation has
provided
them with
the
investigative
and
enforcement
machinery
necessary
to
compel
compliance
with
regulations
against
sex
discrimination in employment. HEW does not have
similar enforcement authority."
438 F. Supp.,
at 1034.

Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the
federal

respondents

in this case, acknowledges what the

Romeo Court thought was self evident:
"The Department of Education has only limited
expertise in employment matters.
Its view is
that employment cases are better resolved under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
provides more appropriate remedies for such
cases." Brief, p. 37.

In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an
unarticulated

intent

predicated

four

impute

on

that

body:

forgetfully

failed

on

the

part

assumptions
(i)
to

that

of

that

I

am

Congress

include

Congress,

language

is

unwilling

to

neglectfuly

or

in

§901

with

respect to discrimination that would have made clear its
intent;

(ii)

proscribing

that
sex

Congress

enacted

discrimination

in

a

third

statute

employment

in

educational institutions in the absence of any showing of
a need for

such duplicative legislation; and

(iii)

that

23.

Congress

failed

to

include

in

the

third

statute

appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to
employment

discrimination;

and

(iv)

finally,

that

it

vested the authority to enforce the third statute in HEW,
a department which even the

Solici ter

General concedes

lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and
enforce employment legislation.

lfp/ss 05/11/82

Rider A, footnote (North Haven)

NORTHFN SALLY-POW
Possibly add a footnote along the following lines at the
point you suggest, Mary:

'"'

The Court puts aside Senator Bayh's statement
that is inconsistent with its position, characterizing the

~-le
statement as "inadvertent".

This hardly gives one
1\

confidence that the Senator's statements selectively
relied upon by the Court are not also inadvertent.

As the

Court's decision concededly is based solely on the floor
debate, we note again--as evidence of how little it
actually supports the Court--that the views of Courts of
Appeals judges with respect to this debate have ranged

2.

from viewing it as indicating no intention to read
employment discrimination into Title IX to recognizing
that--like most floor debates--the oral statements of
Senators even if not ambiguous must be viewed with
skepticism.

'

.

(

~k ~)'

lfp/ss 05/11/82

Rider A, p. 15 (North Haven)

NORTH15 SALLY-POW
Add in text/ of our opinion:

Responding to this dissent, see third paragraph
of fn. 26, ante at 24, the Court states that the factors

~

considered in Part III of my opinion (at 11-15) , and
~

summarized above,"are not relevant" to "ascertaining
legislative intent".

If this were a "plain language"

case, perhaps this statement could be made.

But the Court

recognizes that its position cannot be sustained by the
plain language, and therefore it relies exclusively on
ambiguous and muddled oral statements made in Senate

~ ~ ~ ~<.~~) ;_;r
..

~~

2.

reasonable legislators surely would consider.

After all,

under settled rules of statutory construction legislation

!¥;(cite

bodies are presumed to act reasonably.

,_

17

cases) •

The insistence of the Court

considerations are "irrelevant", and that
look at the brief and ambiguous legislati e
all the more remarkable in light
federal judges.

e views of other

As noted abov , of the six Courts of

Appeals to consider wheth r Title
discrimination, only the Court of Appeals for the Se
/
/
Circuit in thi / case agrees with this Court.
judges on

Courts of Appeals read the

banning employment discrimination.
vi w.

~
But~on the

~ language

/

\

Court's assumption of

there is no justification in our author

ties~

3.

eyes to the legislative

'i,:~ ..t'

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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E UNITED STATES

No. 80-986

NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERREL H. BELL, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[April - , 1982]

POWELL, J., dissenting.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund
recipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(l). Today, the Court upholds the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its legislative history, and several post-enactment events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is
neither consistent with the statutory language nor supported
by its legislative history, I dissent. 2
I

Although the majority begins with the language of the
' As noted by the ~e at-, n. 4, HEW's ~
IX were transferee! to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(av)(3)
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat.
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed. , Supp. IV). I follow the~ ·
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in t is
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at - , n. 4.
2
The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses
.
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at -

..

~

80-986-DISSENT
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL

2

statute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in
the opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section considering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words
of the statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting
an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in
the statute. Thus, according to the Court, "[s]ection 90l's
broad directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against
on the basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what
the statutory language provides.
In relevant part, the statute states:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972,
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a).
~ ~
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or~
•
programs or activities receiving federal
~ Jdc_,_
the beneficiaries
nding. It tortures the language chosen by Congress to
~/-s J
conclude that not only teachers and administrators, but also
secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated against on the
basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) denied participation in a program or activity 3 ; (ii) denied the benefits of a
program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimination under an
education program or activity. Moreover, Congress made
no reference whatever to employers or employees in Title
IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict language in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4

i!J

o-f-

I agree with the majority that employees who directly participate in a
federal program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course,
protected by Title IX. See ante, a t - . -1
' See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful
3

~~

...

~~

~hfy~~~
~~~~

~~I~ C~2-

btA-

~~

~~. ~~~ - ~~--~~

,9 ~,Lt$) ~~--~~~~~
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~~

It is noteworthy that ot one of th{s* Courts of Appeals
to consider the question before us ~achedtfie conclusiOn
that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee v.
Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426 (CAl), cert. denied, 444 U. S.
972 (1979), and that decision has been followed by most other
Courts of Appeals to consider the question. There, the
court concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20
U. S. C. § 1681, on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of
the federal monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged in special
research being funded by the United States government."
The court went on to point out that this reading of "the plain
language of the statute is buttressed by an examination of the
specific exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to students, not employees. 5 Ibid.
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972
(1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit_fejected the
interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, noting that "as actually written, the statute is not nearly so
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees . . . .").
5
The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX
does protect employees." Ante, a t - (citation omitted). I am unable
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h), ot•-tn:efQrQntial emplo;=
o-me11t gf It~diaHs at 8itaQ!isflmeRt.s 6fjePatiHg; QR reset • ~ttions, 42 U. &.-C.
§2008e-2~

-~

o--

80--986-DISSENT
4
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broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language
which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The
court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of
disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against program beneficiaries. 6 Ibid.
II
A
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX
"does not expressly include ... employees." But it finds a
• The question~been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the
, Fifth, Eighth, a~d Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St.
Louts v. Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972
(1972) the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in
Isleslboro. And in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993 (CA9
1980), cert. granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ.,
449 U. S. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier circUit decisions, noting that each of those courts
had held that the plain language of Title IX did not support HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in which the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the regulations, the court did not base its decision on
the statutory language, ~ statectffi'lrt" the "language is more ambiguous
than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777.
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735
(CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty School System,
No. 80--1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the offending program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted
that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances,
e. g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid
with federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case,
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or "subject to discrimination
under" the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indication it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory employment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. eJ secretaries
and administrators as well as teachers.
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strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "exclude employees from its scope". Ante, at--. The Court
then turns to the "legislative history for evidence as to
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment
discrimination". Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee
be relied
discrimination. Only rarely may legislativ ·
upon to read into a statute language that Congress itself d1d
not include. To justify sue a reading of a statute, the legislative history must show clearly and unequivocally that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far short of this
standard.
Title IX was a floor amendment sponsored by Senator
Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The
amen men losef loopholes in earlier civil rights legislation;
three problem areas had been identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. See Discrimination Against
Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H. R. 16098 before the
Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee
on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though generally barring
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion,
or national origin, did not apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255.
And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 banned discrimination in
wages on the basis of sex, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l), but it did
not apply to administrative, executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See 29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no
7

See, e. g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U. S. 402,
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the
legislative intent.").

I
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The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in
1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed
these loopholes.

Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover

employment discrimination in educational institutions.
Ibid.

Sections 1001-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that

discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even
for teachers and other professionals.

Ibid.

And ~§ 1001-

1010 created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the
basis of sex in federally funded educational programs and
activities, thus effectively extending Title VI's
prohibition to sex discrimination in such programs.

--6

longer in force). Fin y, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2 OOd, barred discrimination on the basis
of "race, color, or n tional origin," but not sex, in any federally funded progra s and activities.
The Bayh floor mendment, Amendment No. 874, ~
troduced in 1972, 18 Gong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amend) /!A:..;~
L ~
ment ,
close these loopholes. ~ § 10 ~00
h IM ~~Ameaec;n~~._a new Title IX w.as ePeatet\_ banm~ discrimina. , ..J- ~_./
~ -=tion on th~basis of sex in federally funded educational pro~
grams and activities, thus effectively extending Title VI's
"'prohibition to sex discrimination in federally funded pro'-------- _ grams. Section 005 of that amendment amended Title VII )
to cover em loyment discrimination in· educational instituS.u.,. . . . .,~..,tions. Ibid. A-Rd §§ 1001-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act
- - - - so that discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred,
even for teachers and other professionals. Ibid.
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educational institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination.
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language
- - -. clearly indicates to bar discrimination against beneficiaries
of federally funded rograms and activities. This interpretation of Title IX 1s confirmed by the fact that it was modelled after Title VI of tfie Gtvil &igfits Act of 19W Title VI~
~
was limited in its scope to discrimination against beneficiaries ~
of federally funded programs, not general employment prac~
nd recipients. "\ 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3. 9 And, as

j

8

The opertive language in the two provisions is virtually identical.
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX).
9
42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3 states:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment."
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this Court noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U. S. 677, 770-711 (1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it
expected the new provision to be interpreted consistently
with Title VI, which had been its model.
B
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964,
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
710-711 (1979). This point begs the question, however,
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a
section, i. e. § 604, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3, exressly stating
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX,
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI,
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive.
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor,
House of Representatives-Review of regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975).
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the
Court stresses that the House version of w Senate's Bayh
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equivalent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment,
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante,

8<J-986-DISSENT
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at--. A strong argument, however, can be made that
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that
this change was made at conference simply to eliminate, as
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error.
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of
Representatives-Review of regulations to implement Title
------. IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without reference to
O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is clear
that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and the
Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the
employment diescrimination provisions of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI,
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process.

c
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the
Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single
10

See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm.
on Rules, 88th Cong. , 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman
Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI).
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senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Gong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did
state that faculty employment would be covered by his
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to
redress discrimination in employment.
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers
discrimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at
(quoting 118 Gong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of whether Title IX does.' 2 Moreover, the Court uses an
elipsis rather than include the following words from the second Bayh statement:
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118
Gong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --).
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI
11
The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amendment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant
House and Senate Committees.
12
See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at
- . See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment).
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rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI.
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted
in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the
discussion immediately preceding and following the
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into three sections, two of which were
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services),
the third at employees (employment). While Senator
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, . . . ."
593 F. 2d, at 427.
Rather than support the Court's view, it is fair to say that
the legislative history accords with the natural reading of the
statute. Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of federally funded programs and activities, not all
employment discrimination by recipients of federal funds.
Title IX is modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited-and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be
read to the contrary, they are ambiguous. 13
As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "em3
' The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment actions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at - - . The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to enact,
resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant in
determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimina-
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ployment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legislative history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should a court presume to add what Congress failed to include. And, however else one might
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court today, it is neither clear nor unequivocal.

=>

-~

III
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... " § 901(a).
The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support
for its position in this language, it must look to the "legislative history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was
meant to prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at
- - . Although the Court examines at length the truncated
legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant t~ ~
intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could have been
avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether Congress
had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject; and (iii)
whether existing legislation clearly and adequately proscribed and remedied the conduct in question. When these
factors are considered, there is no
sex e
ment discrimination language into § 901.
If there had been such an intent, no legislative draftsman-even one of modest accomplishments-would have
written § 901 as above set forth. The draftsman would have
tion within Title IX.
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been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination
language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, language specifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these
other statutes had been enacted by an earlier Congress, at
the time Title IX was being drafted and considerecki!'itle VII
and the Equal Pay Act were also amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination in educational institutions
on the basis of sex. Congress 8 hardl~have enacted a
third statute addressing this problem, but, in contrast to the
other two, use language ambiguous at best.
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the
inconsistent provisions of of the latter with respect to remedies and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute with carefully prescribed procedures
for conciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies available within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of
relief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimination and available unless discriminatory conduct falls
within one of several exceptions. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et
seq. This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to Title IX, wftie~ta1ns oruy one ext reme remedy,
fund termination, apparently now available at the request of
any female employee who can prove discrimination in employment in a federally funded program or activity. This
cutoff of funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the
funded program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. Indeed, Title IX does not authorize a single action,
such as employment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify
employment discrimination.· And Title IX, unlike Title VII,
has no time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and
no guidance as to procedure. ~ Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681
1

" It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for administrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII ,
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. , it enacted no comparable provisions in Title

_.--
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et seq. (Title IX) with 42 U. S.C. §2000e et seq. (Title VII).
The Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was
_ _ _..:;:a..:..
va,ilale under Title VII. 15 See transcript of oral argument,
27. ) Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title
IX to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.,("
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive legislation
but also enforcement of these provisions by different departments of government with different enforcement powers,
areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The District
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are
available under Title IX are part of th~egulations promulgated by HEW,
45 CFR §§ 80.7--80.10.
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S. C and
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single problem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§80.9--80.11. In
Contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment
disputes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e,
et seq.
15
An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district
under Title VII, Title IX, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or
her wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition,
request that funds be terminated.
16
The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in employment discrimination, see Brief of Soliciter General 37, n. 26, it will be
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted
to employment discrimination.
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not,
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event

r
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Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp.
1021 (ED Mich. 1977), affd 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6) cert. den.,
444 U. 8. 972 (1979), correctly observed:
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC,
were established specifically for the purpose of regulating discrimination in employment practices. These
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legislation has provided them with the investigative and enforcement machinery necessary to compel compliance
with regulations against sex discrimination in employment. HEW does not have similar enforcement authority." 438 F. Supp., at 1034.
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo
Court thought was self evident:
"The Department of Education has only limited expertise in employment matters. Its view is that employment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropriate remedies for such cases." Brief, p. 37.
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticulated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on four assumptions that I am unwilling to impute " hat body: W.--;-;
th-a7t _ __
Congress neglectfuly or forgetfully failed to include language
in § 901 with respect to discrimination that would have made
clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educational institutions in the absence of any showing of need for such
duplicative legislation;
m t a ongress failed to inc u e
in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; and (iv) fiof non-compliance are quite different.
at-.

See discussion in text supra,
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nally, that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute
in HEW, a department wftieflf ven tne '"So1Iciter "General concedes lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee
and enforce employment legislation.
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POWELL, J., dissenting.
Title IX of the Education ·Amendments of 1972, 20
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund recipients. 34 CFR § 106.5l(a)(l). Today, the Court upholds
the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its legislative history, and several post-enactment
events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is neither consistent with the statutory language nor supported by
its legislative history, I dissent. 2
I

Although the

~~ns

with the language of the

' As noted by the Court, ante, at - , n. 4, HEW's duties under Title
IX were transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(a)(3)
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat.
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the ~Yin
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, a t -, n. 4.
2
The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at - .
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statute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in
the opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section considering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words
of the statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting
an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in
the statute. Thus, according to the Court, "[s]ection 901's
broad directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against
on the basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what
the statutory language provides.
In relevant part, the statute states:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972,
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a).
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or
who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiving federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Congress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators,
but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated
against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) denied participation in a program or activity 3; (ii) denied the
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimination under an education program or activity. Moreover,
Congress made no reference whatever to employers or em,~~~
I agree with th!iful,ajgrity. that employees who directly participate in a
federal program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course,
protected by Title IX. See ante, a t - . Respondents Elaine Dove and
Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any
other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher
and Linda Potz a guidance counseler. Both alleged only discrimination in
employment.
3

'

1

J

~
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ployees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict language in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4
It is noteworthy that not one of the other five Courts of
Appeals to consider the question before us'""J,a.4rreached the
conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the
statutory language. The issue was presented initially to the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School
Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426 (CAl), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), and that decision has been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider the question. There, the court concluded that "[t]he language of
section 901, 20 U. S. C. § 1681, on its face, is aimed at the
beneficiaries of the federal monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded by the United States
government." The court went on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the statute is buttressed by an
examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to students, not employees. 5 Ibid.
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972
(1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the interpretation of the statute now relied on by this
' See, e. g. , 42 U.S. C. §2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees . ... ").
6
The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX
does protect employees." Ante, a t - (citation omitted). I am unable
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h).
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Court, noting that "as actually written, the statute is not
nearly so broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later
language which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at
584. The court concluded that the statute "reaches only
those types of disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against program beneficiaries. 6 Ibid.
II
A
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX
The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1972) the
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but
"adopted" the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in lsleslboro. And in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993 (CA9 1980),
cert. granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449
U. S. 1009 (CA9 1980), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed
the three earlier circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had held
that the plain language of Title IX did not support HEW's position. Even
in the decision below, in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the regulations, the court did not base its decision on the statutory
language, and stated that the "language is more ambiguous than HEW
suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777.
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735
(CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System,
No. 80-1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the offending program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted
that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances,
e. g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid
with federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case,
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or "subject to discrimination
under" the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indication it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory employment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly employees, secretaries and administrators as well as teachers.
6
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"does not expressly include ... employees." But it finds a
strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "exclude employees from its scope". Ante, at--. The Court
then turns to the "legislative history for evidence as to
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment
discrimination". Ibid. I agree with~ several Courts of
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that-the statutory
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee
discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied
upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress
itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute,
the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously
that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The
Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far
short of this standard.
Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in
earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970.
See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805
of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, though generally barring employment discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not
apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352,
title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963
7

See, e. g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U. S. 402,
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the
legislative intent.").
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banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29
U. S. C. § 206(d)(1), but it did not apply to administrative,
executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See
29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no longer in force). Finally, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d,
barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national
origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and
activities.
The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972,
118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed these
loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid. Sections 1009--1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for
teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003
created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities,
thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex
discrimination in such programs.
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educational institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination.
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language
clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries
of federally funded educational programs and activities.
This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it
was modelled after Title VI, a statute Wb limited in its scope
to discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded
programs, not general employment practices of fund recipients. 8 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3. 9 And, as this Court noted in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 77~711
• The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical.
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX).
9
42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3 states:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize ac-
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(1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new
provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which
had been its model.
B
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964,
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
710-711 (1979). This point begs the question, however,
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a
section, i. e. § 604, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3, expressly stating
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX,
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI,
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive.
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor,
House of Representatives-Review of regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Gong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975).
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the
Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equivation under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment."
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lent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment,
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante,
at--. A strong argument, however, can be made that
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that
this change was made at conference simply to eliminate, as
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error.
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of
Representatives-Review of regulations to implement Title
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without reference to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and
the Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI,
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process.

c
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm.
on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman
Geller, House Floor Manager of Title VI) .
10

. '·
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Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single
senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did
state that faculty employment would be covered by his
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to
redress discrimination in employment.
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at
(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of whether Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an
elipsis rather than include the following words from the second Bayh statement:
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --).
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI
11

The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amendment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant
House and Senate Committees.
2
' See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at
- . See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment).
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rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI.
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted
in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the
discussion immediately preceding and following the
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into three sections, two of which were
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services),
the third at employees (employment). While Senator
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, . . . ."
593 F. 2d, at 42~
Rather than support(the Court's view,~
the legislative historyaccords with the natural reading of the
statute. Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of federally funded programs and activities, not all
employment discrimination by recipients of federal funds.
Title IX is modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited-and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be
read to the contrary, they are ambiguous. 13
As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "emThe Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment actions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, a t - - . The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to enact,
resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant in
determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimina13
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ployment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legislative history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should a court presume to add what Congress failed to include. And, however else one might
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court today, it is neither clear nor unequivocal.

III
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... " § 901(a).
The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support
for its position in this language, it must look to the "legislative history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was
meant to prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at
- - . Although the Court examines at length the truncated
legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to
congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could
have been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether
Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject;
and (iii) whether existing legislation clearly and adequately
en
proscribed and
e con uc m question.
these factors ar considered, there is no justification for reading sex employment discrimination langua~g~e~i~n~to~§j29~0~1.:---::-..l-~~c:..:--If there had been such an intent, no egJ.slative draftsrna
·
would have
written § 901 as above set forth. The draftsman would have

~r--------.

tion within Title IX.
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been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination
language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, language specifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these
other statutes had been enacted by an earlier Congress, at
the time Title IX was being drafted and considere .
1t e
VII and the Equal Pay Acili:er@ amended to proscribe
explicitly employment discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language ambiguous at best.
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the
inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedi
and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discri'
nation statute with carefully prescribed procedures for
ciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies ava11...
within certain time limits, and certain specified for
lief, designed to make whole the victims of i
iscrtmmation and available unless discrimin
conduct falls within
one of several exceptions.
e 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.
c ured approach is in sharp contrast to
Title I , whic contains only one extreme remedy, fund terminat
arently now available at the request of any female employee who can prove discrimination in employment
in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded
program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. Indeed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as employment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq.
" It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for administrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII ,
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in Title
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(Title IX) with 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The
Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate
relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was available under Title VII. 15 See Transcript of Oral Argument, 27.
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX
to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In
contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered
by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely
that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive
legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by different departments of government with different enforcement
powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are
available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW,
45 CFR §§ 80.7-80.10.
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S. C and
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single problem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§ 80.9-80.11. In
Contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment
disputes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e,

et seq.
15
An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district
under Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her
wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, request that funds be terminated under Title IX.
16
The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in employment discrimination, see Brief of Soliciter General 37, n. 26, it will be
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted
to employment discrimination.
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not,
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event
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District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), affd 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6)
cert. den., 444 U. S. 972 (1979), correctly observed:
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC,
were established specifically for the purpose of regulating discrimination in employment practices. These
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legislation has provided them with the investigative and enforcement machinery necessary to compel compliance
with regulations against sex discrimination in employment. HEW does not have similar enforcement authority." 438 F. Supp., at 1034.
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo
Court thought was self evident:
"The Department of Education has only limited expertise in employment matters. Its view is that employment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropriate remedies for such cases." Brief, p. 37.
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticu/
lated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated~
ceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i)
that Congress neglectfuly or forgetfully failed to include language in § 901 with respect to discrimination that would have
made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educational institutions in the absence of any showin of a need for
such duplicative legislation; n m
a ongress ailed to
include in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv)
of non-compliance are quite different.
at-.

See discussion in text supra,
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-986
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.,
PETITIONERS, v. TERREL H. BELL, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[April - , 1982]
POWELL, J., dissenting.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund recipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(1). Today, the Court upholds
the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its legislative history, and several post-enactment
events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is neither consistent with the statutory language nor supported by
its legislative history, I dissent. 2
I

Although the Court begins with the language of the stat'As noted by the Court, ante, at - , n. 4, HEW's duties under Title
were transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(a)(3)
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat.
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the Court in
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at - , n. 4.
~ The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, a t -.
IX
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ute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in the
opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section considering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words of the
statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in the
statute. Thus, according to the Court, "(s]ection 901's broad
directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the
basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as
well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what the statutory language provides.
In relevant part, the statute states:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972,
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a).
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or
who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiving federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Congress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators,
but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated
against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) denied participation in a program or activity 3 ; (ii) denied the
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimination under an education program or activity. Moreover,
Congress made no reference whatever to employers or ema I agree with the Court that employees who directly participate in a federal program, i. e. , teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course,
protected by Title IX. See ante, a t -. Respondents Elaine Dove and
Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any
other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher
and Linda Potz a guidance counseler. Both alleged only discrimination in
employment.

'.
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ployees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict language in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4
It is noteworthy that not one of the other five courts of appeals to consider the question before us reached the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory
language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee
v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972
(1979), and that decision has been followed by most other
courts of appeals to consider the question. There, the court
concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 U. S. C.
§ 1681, on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal
monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving
federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being
funded by the United States government." The court went
on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to students, not employees. 5 Ibid.
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979),
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the
interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, not'See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees .... ").
5
The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX
does protect employees." Ante, a t - (citation omitted). I am unable
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h).
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ing that "as actually written, the statute is not nearly so
broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language
which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The
court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of
disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against program beneficiaries. 6 Ibid.
II
A

The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX
"does not expressly include ... employees." But it finds a
6
The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1972) the Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but "adopted"
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Isleslboro. And in
Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993, cert. granted sub nom.
United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U. S. 1009, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier circuit decisions,
noting that each of those courts had held that the plain language of Title IX
did not support HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in which the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations, the court
did not base its decision on the statutory language, and stated that the
"language is more ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at 777.
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735
(CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System,
No. 80-1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the
regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the offending program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted
that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances,
e. g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid
with federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case,
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or "subject to discrimination
under" the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indication it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory employment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly employees, secretaries and administrators as well as teachers.
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strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "exclude employees from its scope." Ante, at--. The Court
then turns to the "legislative history for evidence as to
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment
discrimination." Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee
discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied
upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress
itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute,
the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously
that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The
Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far
short of this standard.
Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in
earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970.
See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805
of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, though generally barring employment discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not
apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88--352,
title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963
banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29
U. S. C. § 206(d)(1), but it did not apply to administrative,
' See, e. g. , Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402,
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the
legislative intent.").
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executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See
29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no longer in force). Finally, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d,
barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national
origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and
activities.
The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972,
118 Gong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed
these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover
employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid.
Sections 100~1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for
teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003
created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities,
thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex
discrimination in such programs.
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educational institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination.
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language
clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries
of federally funded educational programs and activities.
This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it
was modelled after Title VI, a statute limited in its scope to
discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded programs, not general employment practices of fund recipients. 8
42 U.S. C. §2000d-3. 9 And, as this Court noted in Cannon
"The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical.
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX).
9
42U. S.C. §2000d-3states:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary

..
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v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 770-711 (1979),
when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which had
been its model.
B
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964,
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
710-711 (1979). This point begs the question, however,
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a
section, i. e. § 604, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3, expressly stating
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX,
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI,
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive.
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor,
House of Representatives--Review of regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975).
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the
Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equivaobjective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment. "
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lent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment,
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante,
at--. A strong argument, however, can be made that
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that
this change was made at Conference simply to eliminate, as
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error.
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of
Representatives-Review of Regulations to Implement Title
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without reference to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and
the Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI,
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process.

c
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the
10
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm.
on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman
Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI).
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Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single
senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did
state that faculty employment would be covered by his
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to
redress discrimination in employment.
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at
(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of whether Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an
elipsis rather than include the following words from the second Bayh statement:
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --).
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI
The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amendment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant
House and Senate Committees.
12
See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at
- . See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment).
11

·.
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rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI.
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted
in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the
discussion immediately preceding and following the
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into three sections, two of which were
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services),
the third at employees (employment). While Senator
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, .... "
593 F. 2d, at 427.
Rather than supporting the Court's view, the legislative
history accords with the natural reading of the statute.
Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of
federally funded programs and activities, not all employment
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX is
modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited-and to
the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be read to the
contrary, they are ambiguous. 13
'~ The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment actions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at
- - - . The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to
enact, resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant
in determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimina-

~
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As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "employment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legislative history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should a court presume to add what Congress failed to include. And, however else one might
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court today, it is neither clear nor unequivocal.

III
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... " § 901(a).
The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support
for its position in this language, it must look to the "legislative history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was
meant to prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at
- - . Although the Court examines at length the truncated
legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to
congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could
have been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether
Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject;
and (iii) whether existing legislation clearly and adequately
proscribed and provided remedies for the conduct in question. When these factors are considered, there is no justification for reading sex employment discrimination language
into § 901.
tion within Title IX.
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If there had been such an intent, no competent legislative
draftsman would have written § 901 as above set forth. The
draftsman would have been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act, language specifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these other statutes had been enacted by an
earlier Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and
considered Title VII and the Equal Pay Act also were
amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination
in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress
hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this
problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language
ambiguous at best.
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the
inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedies
and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute with carefully prescribed procedures for conciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies available
within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of relief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimination and available unless discriminatory conduct falls within
one of several exceptions. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.
This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to
Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund termination, apparently now available at the request of any female employee who can prove discrimination in employment
in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded
program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. Indeed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as employment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq.
•• It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for ad-

..
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(Title IX) with 42 U.S. C. §2000e et seq. (Title VII). The
Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate
relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was available under Title VII.'5 See Tr. of Oral Arg., 27.
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX
to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In
contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered
by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely
that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive
legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by different departments of government with different enforcement
powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods.'6 The
ministrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII,
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in Title
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are
available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW,
45 CFR §§80.7-80.10.
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S. C and
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single problem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§ 80.9-80.11. In contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment disputes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination
in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.
~ An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district
under Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her
wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, request that funds be terminated under Title IX.
16
The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in employment discrimination, see Brief of Solicitor General 37, n. 26, it will be
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted
to employment discrimination.
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not,
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given
1

•

80-986---DISSENT
14

NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL

District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6),
cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), correctly observed:
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC,
were established specifically for the purpose of regulating discrimination in employment practices. These
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legislation has provided them with the investigative and enforcement machinery necessary to compel compliance
with regulations against sex discrimination in employment. HEW does not have similar enforcement authority." 438 F. Supp., at 1034.
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo
court thought was self evident:
"The Department of Education has only limited expertise in employment matters. Its view is that employment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropriate remedies for such cases." Brief of the Solicotor
General, p. 37.
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticulated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on five perceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i)
that Congress neglectfully or forgetfully failed to include language in§ 901 with respect to discrimination that would have
made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educational institutions in the absence of any showing of a need for
such duplicative legislation; (iii) that Congress failed to intime. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event
of non-compliance are quite different. See discussion in text supra,
at-.
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elude in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv)
that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute in
HEW, a department that even the Solicitor General concedes
lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and enforce employment legislation; and (v) finally, that in Title VI,
it gave a new "remedy" for sex discrimination in employment, but did not make that remedy available to those discriminated against on the basis of race.
Surely Congress has more common sense and expertise
than the Court would attribute to it .
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APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[April - , 1982]
POWELL, J., dissenting.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund recipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(l). Today, the Court upholds
the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its legislative history, and several post-enactment
events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is neither consistent with the statutory language nor supported by
its legislative history, I dissent. 2
I
Although the Court begins with the language of the stat-

'As noted by the Court, ante, at - , n. 4, HEW's duties under Title
transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(a)(3)
of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat.
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the Court in
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at - , n. 4.
2
The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at - .
IX were
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ute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in the
opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section considering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words of the
statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in the
statute. Thus, according to the Court, "(s]ection 901's broad
directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the
basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as
well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what the statutory language provides.
In relevant part, the statute states:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972,
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a).
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or
who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiving federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Congress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators,
but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated
against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) denied participation in a program or activity 3; (ii) denied the
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimination under an education program or activity. Moreover,
Congress made no reference whatever to employers or em3

I agree with the Court that employees who directly participate in a federal program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course,
protected by Title IX. See ante, at - . Respondents Elaine Dove and
Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any
other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher
and Linda Potz a guidance counseler. Both alleged only discrimination in
employmenL
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ployees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict language in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4
It is noteworthy that not one of the other five courts of appeals to consider the question before us reached the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory
language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee
v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972
(1979), and that decision has been followed by most other
courts of appeals to consider the question. There, the court
concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 U. S. C.
§ 1681, on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal
monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving
federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being
funded by the United States government." The court went
on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to students, not employees. 5 Ibid.
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979),
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the
interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, not'See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees.... ").
• The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX
does protect employees." Ante, a t - (citation omitted). I am unable
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h).
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ing that "as actually written, the statute is not nearly so
broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language
which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The
court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of
disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against program beneficiaries. 6 Ibid.
II
A
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX
"does not expressly include ... employees." But it finds a
6
The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1972) the Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but "adopted"
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in I sleslboro. And in
Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993, cert. granted sub nom.
United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U. S. 1009 (1980), the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had held that the plain language of
Title IX did not support HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations,
the court did not base its decision on the statutory language, and stated
that the "language is more ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at
777.
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735
(1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, No.
80-1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the offending
program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances, e. g., if
they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid with
federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case,
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of' or "subject to discrimination
under'' the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indication it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory employment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly employees, secretaries and administrators as well as teachers.
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strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "exclude employees from its scope." Ante, at--. The Court
then turns to the "legislative history for evidence as to
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment
discrimination." Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee
discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied
upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress
itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute,
the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously
that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The
Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far
short of this standard.
Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in
earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970.
See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805
of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, though generally barring employment discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not
apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352,
title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963
banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29
U. S. C. § 206(d)(l), but it did not apply to administrative,
executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See
7

See, e. g., Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402,
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the
legislative intent.").
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29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no longer in force). Finally, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d,
barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national
origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and
activities.
The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972,
118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed
these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover
employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid.
Sections 1009-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for
teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003
created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities,
thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex
discrimination in such programs.
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educational institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination.
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language
clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries
of federally funded educational programs and activities.
This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it
was modelled after Title VI, a statute limited in its scope to
discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded programs, not general employment practices of fund recipients. 8
42 U.S. C. §2000d-3. 9 And, as this Court noted in Cannon
8
The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical.
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX).
9
42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3 states:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment."

.

•'
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v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 770--711 (1979),
when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which had
been its model.
B
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964,
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
710--711 (1979). This point begs the question, however,
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a
section, i. e. §604, 42 U. S.C. §2000d-3, expressly stating
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX,
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI,
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive.
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor,
House of Representatives-Review of regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975).
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the
Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equivalent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment,
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante,

;
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at--. A strong argument, however, can be made that
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that
this change was made at Conference simply to eliminate, as
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error.
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of
Representatives-Review of Regulations to Implement Title
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without reference to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and
the Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI,
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process.

c
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the
Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm.
on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman
Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI).
10

80-986--DISSENT
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL

9

senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did
state that faculty employment would be covered by his
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to
redress discrimination in employment.
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at
(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of whether. Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an
" The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amendment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant
House and Senate Committees.
" See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at
- - . See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment).
The Court argues against the relevance of the portion of Senator Bayh's
statement that is inconsistent with its position, characterizing that portion
as.. "inadvertent". See ante at - - , n. 15. This hardly gives one confidence that the Senator's statements, selectively relied upon by the Court,
are not also inadvertent. Moreover, the Court's decision concededly is
based solely on discussion on the floor of the Senate. We note-as evidence of how little that discussion actually supports the Court-that the
views of Courts of Appeals judges with respect to its import have ranged
from viewing it as indicating no intention to include employment discrimination in Title IX to recognizing that, like most floor debates, the oral
statements of Senators must be viewed with skepticism even when not
ambiguous. See Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 995 (CA6),
cert. granted sub nom., United States Department of Education v. Seattle
University, 449 U. S. 1009 (1980); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW,
600 F . 2d 581, 585 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979); Islesboro

80-986-DISSENT
10

NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL

elipsis rather than include the following words from the second Bayh statement:
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --).
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI
rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI.
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted
in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the
discussion immediately preceding and following the
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into three sections, two of which were
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services),
the third at employees (employment). While Senator
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, .... "
593 F. 2d, at 427.
School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 428 (1979), cert denied, 444 \
u. s. 972 (1979).
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Rather than supporting the Court's view, the legislative
history accords with the natural reading of the statute.
Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of
federally funded programs and activities, not all employment
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX is
modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited-and to
the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be read to the
contrary, they are ambiguous. 13
As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "employment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legislative history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should a court presume to add what Congress failed to include. And, however else one might
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court today, it is neither clear nor unequivocal.

III
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... " § 901(a).
3
' The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment actions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at
- - - . The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to
enact, resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant
in determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimination within Title IX.
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The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support
for its position in this language, it must look to the "legislative history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was
meant to prohibit employment discrimination". Ante, at
- - . Although the Court examines at length the truncated
legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to
congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could
have been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether
Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject;
and (iii) whether existing legislation clearly and adequately
proscribed and provided remedies for the conduct in question. When these factors are considered, there is no justification for reading sex employment discrimination language
into § 901.
If there had been such an intent, no competent legislative
draftsman would have written§ 901 as above set forth. The
draftsman would have been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act, language specifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these other statutes had been enacted by an
earlier Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and
considered Title VII and the Equal Pay Act also were
amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination
in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress
hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this
problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language
ambiguous at best.
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the
inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedies
and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute with carefully prescribed procedures for conciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies available
within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of relief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimina-
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tion and available unless discriminatory conduct falls within
one of several exceptions. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq.
This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to
Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund termination, apparently now available at the request of any female employee who can prove discrimination in employment
in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded
program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. Indeed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as employment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq.
(Title IX) with 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The
Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate
relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was available under Title VII. 15 See Tr. of Oral Arg., 27.
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX
to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In
It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for administrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII,
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in Title
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are
available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW,
45 CFR §§ 80.7-80.10.
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S.C and
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single problem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§ 80.9-80.11. In contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment disputes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination
in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.
'"An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district
under Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her
wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, request that funds be terminated under Title IX.
14
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contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered
by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely
that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive
legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by different departments of government with different enforcement
powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The
District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6),
cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), correctly observed:
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC,
were established specifically for the purpose of regulating discrimination in employment practices. These
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legislation has provided them with the investigative and enforcement machinery necessary to compel compliance
with regulations against sex discrimination in employment. HEW does not have similar enforcement authority." 438 F. Supp., at 1034.
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo
court thought was self evident:
16
The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in employment discrimination, see Brief of Solicitor General 37, n. 26, it will be
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted
to employment discrimination.
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not,
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event
of non-compliance are quite different. See discussion in text supra,
a t -.

)/.
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"The Department of Education has only limited expertise in employment matters. Its view is that employment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropriate remedies for such cases." Brief of the Solicitor General, p. 37.
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticulated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on five perceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i)
that Congress neglectfully or forgetfully failed to include language in § 901 with respect to discrimination that would have
made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educational institutions in the absence of any showing of a need for
such duplicative legislation; (iii) that Congress failed to include in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv)
that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute in
HEW, a department that even the Solicitor General concedes
lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and enforce employment legislation; and (v) finally, that in Title IX,
it gave a new "remedy" for sex discrimination in employment, but did not make that remedy available to those discriminated against on the basis of race.
In response to this dissent, see n. 26, ante at 24, the Court
states that the factors considered in Part III, supra at - - - , summarized above, "are not relevant" to "ascertaining
legislative intent". If this were a "plain language" case, this
statement probably would be unobjectionable. But the
Court recognizes that its position cannot be sustained solely
by the plain language of the statute, and it therefore relies
heavily on ambiguous and muddled oral statements made on
the floor of the Senate. In these circumstances, it defies
reason to say that a court should not consider what reasonable legislators surely would have considered. Where ambi- \
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guity exists surely it is not "irrelevant", to the process of ascertaining the intention of Congress, to consider specifically
other statutes on the same subject. Nor must a court shun
common sense in resolving ambiguities. 17

"See, e. g., Buckey v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 77 (1976) (when statute is
ambiguous, Court must "draw upon 'those common-sense assumptions that
must be made in determining direction without a compass.'") (citation
ommitted); Fairport R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589, 595 (1934) (the interpretation that a reasonable Congress would have intended is adopted by
the Court); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 456.12, at
38 (4th ed. 1973) (legislative bodies presumed to act reasonably). See also
Kokoszkav. Beljo1·d, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974) ("When 'interpreting a statute, the Court will look not merely to a particular clause in which general
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or
statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the
Jaw, ... .'").
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-986
NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL. ,
PETITIONERS, v. TERREL H. BELL, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal
funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund recipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(l). Today, the Court upholds
the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its legislative history, and several post-enactment
events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is neither consistent with the statutory language nor supported by
its legislative history, I dissent. 2

1

As noted by the Court, ante, at - , n. 4, HEW's duties under Title

IX were transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by § 301(a)(3)

of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 69-88, 93 Stat.
678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the Court in
referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this
case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at - , n. 4.
2
The Court acknowledges that the post-enactment events it discusses
only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at - .

\

_ _
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I

Although the Court begins with the language of the statute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in the
opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section considering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words of the
statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in the
statute. Thus, according to the Court, "[s]ection 90l's broad
directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the
basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as
well as students." Ante, at--. This is not what the statutory language provides.
In relevant part, the statute states:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . .. " Education Amendments of 1972,
§ 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a).
A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's
scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or
who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiving federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Congress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators,
but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated
against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) denied participation in a program or activity 3; (ii) denied the
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discriminaI agree with the Court that employees who directly participate in a federal program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course,
protected by Title IX. See ante, a t - . Respondents Elaine Dove and
Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any
other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher
and Linda Potz a guidance counseler. Both alleged only discrimination in
employment.
3
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tion under an education program or activity. Moreover,
Congress made no reference whatever to employers or employees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explict language in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4
It is noteworthy that not one of the other five courts of appeals to consider the question before us reached the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory
language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee
v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972
(1979), and that decision has been followed by most other
courts of appeals to consider the question. There, the court
concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 U. S. C.
§ 1681, on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal
monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving
federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being
funded by the United States government." The court went
on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the
statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to students, not employees. 5 Ibid.
In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools
v. HEW, 600 F. 2d 581, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979),
'See, e. g., 42 U.S. C. §2000e-2 (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer-"); 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (Equal
Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees.... ").
' The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes
that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of
exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Title IX
does protect" employees. Ante, at - - (citation omitted). I am unable
to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions
may not be conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the
statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the
statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions
similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe
bona fide seniority plans, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h).
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the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the
interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, noting that "as actually written, the statute is not nearly so
broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language
which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F. 2d, at 584. The
court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of
disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against program beneficiaries. 6 Ibid.
II
A
The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F. 2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1972) the Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit considered HEW's arguments but "adopted"
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in I sleslboro. And in
Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 993, cert. granted sub nom.
United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U. S. 1009 (1980), the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier circuit decisions, noting that each of those courts had held that the plain language of
Title IX did not support HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations,
the court did not base its decision on the statutory language, and stated
that the "language is more ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F. 2d, at
777.
The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 735
(1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, No.
~1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the offending
program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances, e. g., if
they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid with
federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal
funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case,
the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of' or "subject to discrimination
under" the federal program. 622 F. 2d, at 737-738. But there is no indication it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports
program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory employment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly employees, secretaries and administrators as well as teachers.
6
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The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX
"does not expressly include . . . employees." But it finds a
strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "exclude employees from its scope." Ante, at--. The Court
then turns to the legislative history for evidence as to
whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment
discrimination. Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of
Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory
language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee
discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied
upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress
itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute,
the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously
that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The
Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far
short of this standard.
Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by
Senator Bayh to Senate Bill, S. 659, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in
earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been
identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970.
See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805
of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, though generally barring employment discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not
apply to discrimination "with respect to employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. No. 88-352,
title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963
7
See, e. g. , Citizens to Preserve Overtyon Park v. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402,
412 n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the
legislative intent.").
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banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29
U. S. C. § 206(d)(1), but it did not apply to administrative,
executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See
29 U. S. C. § 213(a) (1970) (no longer in force). Finally, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d,
barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national
origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and
activities.
The Bayh floor Amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972,
118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed
these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover
employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid.
Sections 1009-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that
discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for
teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003
created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of
sex in federally funded educational programs and activities,
thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex
discrimination in such programs.
Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educational institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003
of the Bayh Amendment to proscribe such discrimination.
Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language
clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries
of federally funded educational programs and activities.
This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it
was modelled after Title VI, a statute limited in its scope to
discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded programs, not general employment practices of fund recipients. 8
42 U.S. C. §2000d-3. 9 And, as this Court noted in Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 770-711 (1979),
8

The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical.
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U. S. C. § 1681a (Title IX).
9
42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3 states:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize ac-
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when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which had
been its model.
B
The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the
proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it
notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964,
that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at
--(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
710-711 (1979). This point begs the question, however,
since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title
IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment
discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court
for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a
section, i. e. § 604, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-3, expressly stating
that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an
earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX,
the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI,
simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title
IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the
reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive.
Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the
Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education and Labor,
House of Representatives-Review of regulations to implement Title IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975).
Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the
Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh
Amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equivation under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to
any department or agency or labor organization except where a primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment."
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lent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of
the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment,
but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante,
at - - . A strong argument, however, can be made that
there was a non-substantive reason for eliminating § 1004
from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that
this change was made at Conference simply to eliminate, as
quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error.
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, House of
Representatives-Review of Regulations to Implement Title
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 409 (1975). Even without reference to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is
clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and
the Senate's Bayh Amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a
drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill
applied to employment, though sections of the House Bill, as
well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI,
§ 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is
on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use
of the ritualistic words "the House receded" reveals a substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious
drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process.

c
In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX
was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General
Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm.
on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 198 (1964) (statement of Congressman
Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI).
10
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Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single
senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at - - (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did
state that faculty employment would be covered by his
amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX
but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated
that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title
VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to
redress discrimination in employment.
Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at
(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But, § 1005 of
the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and
thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of whether Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an
11

The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the
responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amendment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant
House and Senate Committees.
12
See description of various sections of the Bayh Amendment, supra, at
- - . See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment).
The Court argues against the relevance of the portion of Senator Bayh's
statement that is inconsistent with its position, characterizing that portion
as "inadvertent". See ante a t - , n. 15. This hardly gives one confidence that the Senator's statements, selectively relied upon by the Court,
are not also inadvertent. Moreover, the Court's decision concededly is
based solely on discussion on the floor of the Senate. We note-as evidence of how little that discussion actually supports the Court-that the
views of Courts of Appeals judges with respect to its import have ranged
from viewing it as indicating no intention to include employment discrimination in Title IX to recognizing that, like most floor debates, the oral
statements of Senators must be viewed with skepticism even when not
ambiguous. See Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F. 2d 992, 995 (CA6),
cert. granted sub nom., United States Department of Education v. Seattle
University, 449 U. S. 1009 (1980); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW,
600 F. 2d 581, 585 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979); Islesboro
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elipsis rather than include the following words from the second Bayh statement:
"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by
title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately
the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the
basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions
which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipses ante, at --).
Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he
regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI
rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI.
In the third Bayh statement, ante, at-- (quoting 118
Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a
question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court
assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title
IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted
in Islesboro:
"A fair reading both of the colloquy ... , as well as the
discussion immediately preceding and following the
above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into three sections, two of which were
specifically aimed at students (admissions and services),
the third at employees (employment). While Senator
Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be
for a direct answer to Senator Pell's quetion, we think
HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly
in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and
thus not as prescise as a response in written form, . . . ."
593 F. 2d, at 427.
School Committee v. Califano, 593 F. 2d 424, 428 (1979), cert denied, 444
u. s. 972 (1979).
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Rather than supporting the Court's view, the legislative
history accords with the natural reading of the statute.
Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of
federally funded programs and activities, not all employment
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX is
modelled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited-and to
the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be read to the
contrary, they are ambiguous.'3
As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "employment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its
meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to
add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legislative history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should a court presume to add what Congress failed to include. And, however else one might
describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court today, it is neither clear nor unequivocal.

III
As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of
Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... " § 901(a).
The Court devotes considerable time to describing post-enactment actions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at
- - - . The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to
enact, resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant
in determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the
fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact bills limiting Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not
indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimination within Title IX.
18
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The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support
for its position in this language, it must look to the legislative
history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was meant to
prohibit employment discrimination. Ante, at - - . Although the Court examines at length the truncated legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could have
been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise
in legislating with respect to this particular subject; and (iii)
whether existing legislation clearly and adequately proscribed and provided remedies for the conduct in question.
When these factors are considered, there is no justification
for reading sex employment discrimination language into
§901.
If there had been such an intent, no competent legislative
draftsman would have written § 901 as above set forth. The
draftsman would have been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act, language specifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these other statutes had been enacted by an
earlier Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and
considered Title VII and the Equal Pay Act also were
amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination
in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress
hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this
problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language
ambiguous at best.
In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and
Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the
inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedies
and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute with carefully prescribed procedures for conciliation by the EEOC, federal court remedies available
within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of relief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimina-
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tion and available unless discriminatory conduct falls within
one of several exceptions. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.
This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to
Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund termination, apparently now available at the request of any female employee who can prove discrimination in employment
in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded
program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. Indeed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as employment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no
time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to procedure. 14 Compare 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq.
(Title IX) with 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII). The
Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate
relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was available under Title Vll.'5 See Tr. of Oral Arg., 27.
Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX
to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In
" It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for administrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII,
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it enacted no comparable provisions in Title
IX, see 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are
available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW,
45 CFR §§ 80.7--80.10.
The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the U. S. C and
by HEW in the CFR are quite different, though addressing a single problem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative-Procedure-Act
hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR §§ 80.9--80.11. In contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment disputes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination
in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.
16
An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district
under Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her
wrong in the form of back pay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, request that funds be terminated under Title IX.

'•
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contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered
by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely
that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive
legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by different departments of government with different enforcement
powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The
District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438
F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), affd, 600 F. 2d 581 (CA6),
cert. denied, 444 U. S. 972 (1979), correctly observed:
"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC,
were established specifically for the purpose of regulating discrimination in employment practices. These
agencies have the expertise and their enabling legislation has provided them with the investigative and enforcement machinery necessary to compel compliance
with regulations against sex discrimination in employment. HEW does not have similar enforcement authority." 438 F. Supp., at 1034.
Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo
court thought was self evident:
16

The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental
bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in employment discrimination, see Brief of Solicitor General 37, n. 26, it will be
required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the anti-discrimination
in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate
the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted
to employment discrimination.
From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two
sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment
practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not,
have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given
time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event
of non-compliance are quite different. See discussion in text supra,
at--.

t
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"The Department of Education has only limited expertise in employment matters. Its view is that employment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropriate remedies for such cases." Brief of the Solicitor General, p. 37.
In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticulated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on five perceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i)
that Congress neglectfully or forgetfully failed to include language in§ 901 with respect to discrimination that would have
made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educational institutions in the absence of any showing of a need for
such duplicative legislation; (iii) that Congress failed to include in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv)
that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute in
HEW, a department that even the Solicitor General concedes
lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and enforce employment legislation; and (v) finally, that in Title IX,
it gave a new "remedy" for sex discrimination in employment, but did not make that remedy available to those discriminated against on the basis of race.
In response to this dissent, see n. 26, ante at 24, the Court
states that the factors considered in Part III, supra at - - - , summarized above, "are not relevant" to "ascertaining
legislative intent". If this were a "plain language" case, this
statement probably would be unobjectionable. But the
Court recognizes that its position cannot be sustained solely
by the plain language of the statute, and it therefore relies
heavily on ambiguous and muddled oral statements made on
the floor of the Senate. In these circumstances, it defies
reason to say that a court should not consider what reasonable legislators surely would have considered. Where ambi-

•t·
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guity exists surely it is not "irrelevant," to the process of ascertaining the intention of Congress, to consider specifically
other statutes on the same subject. Nor must a court shun
common sense in resolving ambiguities. 17

See, e. g., Buckey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (when statute is
ambiguous, Court must "draw upon 'those common-sense assumptions that
must be made in determining direction without a compass.'") (citation
ommitted); Fairport R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589, 595 (1934) (the interpretation that a reasonable Congress would have intended is adopted
by the Court); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 456.12,
at 38 (4th ed. 1973) (legislative bodies presumed to act reasonably). See
also Kokoszkav. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974) ("When 'interpreting a
statute, the Court will look not merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, .
17

. . . '").

